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I. INTRODUCTION

“[T]here is no liberty if the power of judging be not
separated from the legislative and executive powers.”1
In the United States, redistricting is defined as the redrawing of
congressional and state legislative district boundaries every ten
years, following a United States Census.2 Redistricting is intended to
ensure that all voters in a district are fairly and reasonably equally
represented by their House and state legislative representatives.
Underlying the redistricting process—which is typically conducted
within each state—is an inherent objective to safeguard the electoral
process fairly and impartially.3 “[D]rawing lines for congressional
districts is one of the most significant acts a State can perform to
ensure citizen participation in republican self-governance.”4
Regardless of how impartial redistricting is intended to be, it is
often conducted by partisan elected officials (namely, state legislative
bodies) who have vested interests in both protecting their own
incumbency and protecting or expanding their political party’s
opportunity to get their chosen candidates elected.5 Federal and state
courts have repeatedly recognized that state legislatures have
1. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
2. See U.S. C ONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (requiring the federal government to conduct a
census every ten years for the purpose of apportioning U.S. House of Representatives
seats among the states).
3. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 307 (2004) (“The object of districting is to
establish ‘fair and effective representation for all citizens.’” (citation omitted)).
4. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 416 (2006).
5. See, e.g., id. at 410–13 (explaining how Democrats drew district maps in the
1990s with the express goal of winning more seats and how Republicans did the same
following the 2000 census).
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primacy in the redistricting process6 and that it is an inherently
political process.7 While these are not unexpected considerations, it
also has been recognized that the redistricting process can produce
efforts to manipulate political boundaries in favor of certain parties,
resulting in “gerrymandered” districts—that reflect desired political
outcomes more than a balanced representation of the electorate.8
Such districts are frequently oddly shaped, and neither conform to
obvious geographic, county, or municipal boundaries nor reflect
natural communities of interest.
Gerrymandering can be based on any number of theories related
to maximizing a party’s opportunities to increase or maintain power,
including: managing how persons of a particular minority group are
included in (or excluded from) districts; incumbent protection plans
that minimize the number of incumbents who are paired in a redrawn
district or who must represent a different group of individuals than in
the past; or partisan gerrymandering that seeks to consolidate or
divide partisan voters. Gerrymandering around groups of voters is
said to work most often through the “cracking” and “packing” of
voters.9 By definition, “[c]racking means dividing a party’s supporters
among multiple districts so that they fall short of a majority in each
one[,] [while] [p]acking means concentrating one party’s backers in a
few districts that they win by overwhelming margins.”10
The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that certain
forms of packing and cracking are illegal11 and, if proven, will result
6. See id. at 414 (Article I of the Constitution “leaves with the States primary
responsibility for apportionment of their federal congressional . . . districts.”)
(quoting Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 34 (1993)).
7. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 285 (“The Constitution clearly contemplates districting
by political entities . . . and unsurprisingly that turns out to be root-and-branch a
matter of politics.”); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973) (“The reality is
that districting inevitably has and is intended to have substantial political
consequences.”).
8. See Erick Trickey, Where Did the Term “Gerrymander” Come From?,
SMITHSONIAN (July 20, 2017), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/where-didterm-gerrymander-come-180964118/
[https://perma.cc/7WL9-W48Y].
For
example, an 1812 Massachusetts district was “freakishly shaped” in order to elect
Democratic-Republican senators. See id. This district gave rise to the term
“gerrymander” when opponents of Governor Elbridge Gerry noted that the district
looked like a salamander, “a satire so piercing, it has overshadowed all of Gerry’s
other accomplishments in history.” Id.
9. Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1923 (2018).
10. Id.
11. E.g., racial gerrymandering in violation of the Voting Rights Act
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in declaring a district or state redistricting map to be
unconstitutional.12 This is because, under the United States
Constitution, fair representation requires that one person’s vote
should not carry any more weight than another person’s vote.13
However, partisan gerrymandering presents one of the more unique
and thornier issues facing the judiciary today. Partisan
gerrymandering—sometimes known as political gerrymandering—is
defined as “the drawing of legislative district lines to subordinate
adherents of one political party and entrench a rival party in
power.”14
On the one hand, state legislatures—and generally the majority
party of the legislative bodies—have primacy in redrawing
congressional and legislative district boundaries. Moreover, Congress
and state legislatures are inherently political bodies. Despite this
reality, the Court has held that negative presumptions should not
automatically attach to legislative plans.15 Additionally, it is expected
and accepted that political goals will play a role in redistricting
conducted by state legislatures.16
On the other hand, overly-partisan gerrymandering has been a
concern since the early days of the republic, as its effect on
representation can lead to profound impacts on a wide variety of

12. See id. See also Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017) (holding racial
gerrymandering in violation of §2 of the Voting Rights Act to be illegal).
13. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (“Simply stated, an individual’s
right to vote for state legislators is unconstitutionally impaired when its weight is in
a substantial fashion diluted when compared with votes of citizens living on other
parts of the State.”).
14. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652,
2658 (2015). While the term “political redistricting” is commonly used to describe
drawing districts with political party affiliation as a key criteria, as previously noted
all redistricting is political to some extent. Therefore, we use the term “partisan
redistricting” throughout this article to reference potential gerrymandering based on
political party affiliation, unless quoting a source that itself uses the term “political
redistricting.” See also League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 417
(2006) (using “partisan gerrymandering” in a context similar to that defined in this
article) (“[P]artisan gerrymandering . . . [r]educes the likelihood that . . .
representatives elected from gerrymandered districts will act as vigorous advocates
for the needs and interests of [those] who reside within their districts.”).
15. League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 548 U.S. at 416.
16. See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973) (“The reality is that
districting inevitably has and is intended to have substantial political
consequences.”).
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significant political issues of the day.17 Furthermore, technology has
increased the accuracy and sophistication of political mapmaking,
giving rise to the creation of partisan advantages during the
redistricting process.18 And as technology advances, more extreme
partisan gerrymandering becomes feasible.19 Unsurprisingly, the
body of judicial opinions addressing gerrymandering has expanded
over time, as this article discusses in more detail.20 In these contexts,
the United States Supreme Court has, in more recent years, felt
compelled to identify overly-partisan gerrymandering as a potentially
unconstitutional act.
The increasing focus on partisan gerrymandering results in a
fundamental tension around the judiciary’s involvement in partisan
gerrymandering issues. The United States Supreme Court has stated
that redistricting is required under the United States Constitution
because it is critical to fair elections in a representative democracy.
Consequently, gerrymandered redistricting plans that frustrate this
constitutional obligation impliedly create “claims” or “controversies”
that courts must address, despite the obvious justiciability questions
implicated by these cases.21

17. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 274 (2004) (citation omitted) (“Political
gerrymanders are not new to the American scene. One scholar traces them back to
the Colony of Pennsylvania at the beginning of the 18th century, where several
counties conspired to minimize the political power of the city of Philadelphia by
refusing to allow it to merge or expand into surrounding jurisdictions, and denying it
additional representatives.”).
18. See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1941 (2018) (Kagan, J., concurring) (“But
technology makes today’s gerrymandering altogether different from the crude
linedrawing of the past. New redistricting software enables pinpoint precision in
designing districts. With such tools, mapmakers can capture every last bit of partisan
advantage, while still meeting traditional districting requirements (compactness,
contiguity, and the like).”); Vann R. Newkirk II, Partisan Gerrymandering Stands, for
Now,
THE
ATLANTIC
(June
18,
2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/06/partisan-gerrymanderingstands-for-now/563063/ [https://perma.cc/3MTH-F545].
19. Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1941.
20. See infra Part III.C.
21. See generally Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017) (finding a justiciable
controversy where North Carolina officials drew district lines on the basis of race
despite their claims of political motivations); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735
(1973) (determining that reapportionment plans are acceptable when they secure
partisan fairness); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (requiring states to
reapportion their districts based upon changes in population).
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At what point should such an inherently political process be
subject to judicial review for being “too” political? More importantly,
to what extent might the judiciary be injuring its own authority as an
independent, non-partisan branch of government when it must
decide for or against a particular political party in partisan
gerrymandering cases—especially in such an increasingly polarized
political environment? This article attempts to answer these
questions, focusing not only on how these problems arise, but also
potential solutions.
First, this article focuses on the judiciary’s unique and specific
role as one of three branches of government in the United States; the
limitations of the judiciary with respect to addressing political
questions under the political question doctrine; and the general
criticisms of the judiciary’s involvement in highly-politicized cases.22
Second, this article discusses the evolution of gerrymandering claims
that have come before the United States Supreme Court, starting with
early cases where the Court explained its rationale for evaluating
gerrymandering claims, and culminating with an examination of more
recent partisan gerrymandering decisions.23 Finally, this article
concludes by proposing a standard for assessing undue political
manipulation of the redistricting process and identifies steps the
judiciary might take to uphold its integrity when deciding such
difficult questions.24
II. THE JUDICIARY’S ROLE IN POLITICAL CASES AND CONTROVERSIES
Before turning to the specific issue of political gerrymandering, it
is important to first identify the judiciary’s specific role in a
government premised on a separation of powers and to set forth longstanding considerations for judicial involvement in politicallycharged legal claims. This section examines the tension between the
judiciary’s obligation to serve as a non-political check on the other
branches of government, and its desire to stay out of political issues
to maintain public faith and the basic integrity of the judicial system.
Next, this section shows how the fundamental tensions in this area
existed well before reaching such highly political and specific issues
like legislative redistricting. Finally, this section recognizes how, in
recent years, the United States Supreme Court has issued politically22.
23.
24.

See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
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charged decisions, and has struggled to maintain public faith in the
integrity of the subsequent outcomes.25
A. Role of the Judiciary
To understand the scope of the courts’ potential involvement in
redistricting cases, it is first important to understand the judiciary’s
role within the federal government. It is equally important to
appreciate that state governments are similarly modeled on a
separation of powers concept that divides the executive, legislative,
and judicial branches of government. This overarching concept is
crucial to understanding redistricting cases because they occur at the
intersection between the three branches of government.
At the federal level, Article III of the United States Constitution
establishes the judicial branch, providing that the “judicial Power of
the United States, shall be vested in one supreme court, and in such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish.”26 This branch of government differs significantly from the
executive and legislative branches in that the members of the
judiciary are appointed by the President and subsequently confirmed
by the Senate,27 whereas members of the executive and legislative
branches are elected. Federal judges serve life terms, removable only
through impeachment proceedings held by the House of
Representatives and subsequent conviction by the Senate.28 Granting
lifetime appointments to federal judges “insulates them from the
temporary passions of the public, and allows them to apply the law
with only justice in mind, and not electoral or political concerns.”29
Starting with Chief Justice John Marshall’s landmark opinion in
Marbury v. Madison, and continuing through the present, the United
States Supreme Court has carefully defined its role as an independent
branch of government that functions as a check on the legislative
branch, but nevertheless avoids answering purely political
questions.30 The Supreme Court recognized early on that “[i]t is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
25. See, e.g., Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018).
26. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
27. Id. art. II, § 2 (“[The President] . . . shall nominate, and by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . Judges of the Supreme Court . . . .”).
28. Id. art. III.
29. The Judicial Branch, THE WHITE H OUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/aboutthe-white-house/the-judicial-branch/ [https://perma.cc/HL4Q-6LJM].
30. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 165–66 (1803).
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what the law is.”31 This “power [of] judges to ‘say what the law is’ rests
not on the default of politically accountable officers, but is instead
grounded in and limited by the necessity of resolving, according to
legal principles, a plaintiff’s particular claim of legal right.”32
“Sometimes, however, the law is that the judicial department has no
business entertaining the claim of unlawfulness—because the
question is entrusted to one of the political branches or involves no
judicially enforceable rights.”33 As Justice Scalia pronounced in Vieth:
“The judicial Power” created by Article III, § 1, of the
Constitution is not whatever judges choose to do, or even
whatever Congress chooses to assign them. It is the power to
act in the manner traditional for English and American
courts. One of the most obvious limitations imposed by that
requirement is that judicial action must be governed by
standard, by rule. Laws promulgated by the Legislative
Branch can be inconsistent, illogical, and ad hoc; law
pronounced by the courts must be principled, rational, and
based upon reasoned distinctions.34
It is important to recall that Article III of the Constitution restricts
judicial consideration to only those matters constituting “case[s] or
controvers[ies].”35 This limitation means that a party has standing to
seek judicial action only when suffering an injury that is “concrete,
particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling.”36 In other
words, courts existing under Article III may not issue advisory
opinions,37 nor address general grievances.38 Thus, for any case—
including a redistricting case—to be heard by federal judges, it must
first clear the hurdle of establishing standing.
Finally, the constitutional limitations placed on the judiciary to
“say what the law is” are “grounded in and limited by the necessity of
resolving, according to legal principles, a plaintiff’s particular claim of
legal right.”39
31. Id. at 177.
32. Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1929 (2018) (citation omitted).
33. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277 (2004).
34. Id. at 278 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
35. U.S. C ONST. Art. III, § 2.
36. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 149, 149 (2010) (citation
omitted).
37. See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361 (1911).
38. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573 (1992).
39. Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1929 (2018).
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B. Political Question
Judicial power is further limited when the claim made is one of a
purely political nature—an issue of particular importance in political
redistricting cases. The political question doctrine functions as “one
of the rules basic to the federal system and [the Supreme] Court’s
appropriate place within that structure.”40 Issues that are purely
political in nature are considered “political questions” that are
reserved for the legislative and executive branches. The political
question doctrine has been central to historic arguments that the
judiciary is not the appropriate forum to consider matters of political
gerrymandering.
Courts have long recognized the need to avoid encroachment
upon the functions of the political branches. The political question
doctrine dates back to Marbury v. Madison.41 In that case, the Supreme
Court insisted that its role was “solely[] to decide on the rights of
individuals, not to enquire how the executive, or executive officers,
perform duties in which they have a discretion.”42 Similarly, more
than two centuries later, the Court said, “[s]ometimes, however, the
law is that the judicial department has no business entertaining the
claim of unlawfulness—because the question is entrusted to one of
the political branches or involves no judicially enforceable rights.”43
The political question doctrine is embedded in both
“constitutional and prudential considerations,” and has been said to
be “essentially a function of the separation of powers.”44 It exists
principally so that courts may avoid “inappropriate[ly] interfer[ing]
in the business of the other branches of Government.”45 Moreover, the
political question doctrine highlights the inherent distinction
between the judicial branch and the other two branches of

40. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 189, 278 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
41. 5 U.S. 137, 170 (1803).
42. Id.
43. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277 (2004).
44. JARED P. COLE, THE P OLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE: JUSTICIABILITY AND THE
SEPARATION
OF
P OWERS
6
(Dec.
23,
2014)
(citation
omitted),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43834.pdf [https://perma.cc/SVV5-9K2J].
45. U.S. v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 394 (1990).
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government,46 and by doing so advances the separation of powers. 47
Further, by leaving wholly political questions to the coordinate
branches, the judiciary can maintain the public’s faith in the
judiciary’s ability to remain independent, remain free of undue
political bias, and rely on precedent and good judgment even as it
interprets the core laws of the land.48
In Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court established six standards to
identify the existence of a political question:
[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of
the issue to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack
of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court’s undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the
respect due coordinate branches of government; or [5] an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political
decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question.49
The Baker case involved a civil rights challenge to the
redistricting of Tennessee’s electoral map.50 The Baker Court was
presented with an argument that Tennessee had failed to redraw its
legislative districts every ten years, as was required by the state
46. Compare the judicial branch—which, notably, at the federal level consists of
appointed judges who are not subject to election or re-election—to the legislative and
executive branches that are both comprised of elected officials who are subject to
regular reelection.
47. “[T]he issue in the political question doctrine is not whether the
constitutional text commits exclusive responsibility for a particular governmental
function to one of the political branches[,]” but whether “the Constitution has given
one of the political branches final responsibility for interpreting the scope and nature
of such a power.” Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) (White, J., concurring)
(emphasis omitted).
48. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(“The Court’s authority . . . ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its moral
sanction. Such feeling must be nourished by the Court’s complete detachment, in fact
and in appearance, from political entanglements and by abstention from injecting
itself into the clash of political forces in political settlements.”).
49. Id. at 217.
50. Id. at 187–88 (“The complaint[] alleg[es] that . . . these plaintiffs and others
similarly situated, are denied the equal protection of the law accorded them by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States by virtue of the
debasement of their votes . . . .”) (citation omitted).
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constitution, which resulted in rural votes holding more weight than
urban votes.51 The Supreme Court held that equal protection
challenges to state legislature-drawn electoral maps were important,
justiciable, and not barred by the political question doctrine.52
This holding has been reaffirmed by several Supreme Court
decisions, including Davis v. Bandemer, in which the majority stated
that:
Since Baker v. Carr, we have consistently adjudicated equal
protection claims in the legislative districting context
regarding inequalities in population between districts. In
the course of these cases, we have developed and enforced
the “one person, one vote” principle. Our past decisions also
make clear that, even where there is no population deviation
among the districts, racial gerrymandering presents a
justiciable equal protection claim.53
The Bandemer majority rejected the proposition that political
redistricting cases may be non-justiciable, and further concluded that
none of the previously established characteristics of a non-justiciable
political question were present in that case.54 The majority also
explained that a political gerrymandering case is, essentially, no less
manageable than racial gerrymandering cases that the Court has
found to be justiciable.55 Finally, a plurality of the Court concluded
that the district court erred by finding the contested map violated the
Equal Protection Clause, which is notable because the case was found
to be justiciable merely by answering the question.56
Interestingly, since Baker, the Supreme Court has only dismissed
claims as non-justiciable under the political question doctrine on
three occasions.57 One of these cases was Vieth v. Jubelirer, a case that
51. Id.
52. Id. at 209–10.
53. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 118 (1986) (internal citation omitted); see
also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
54. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 143. More specifically, the Democrats claimed that an
Indiana legislative reapportionment plan constituted a political gerrymander
intended to disadvantage Democrats, which the Court ultimately found to be nonjusticiable. See id.
55. Id. at 125–27.
56. Id. at 129.
57. Vieth was one such case, and is discussed in depth in this article. See Vieth v.
Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004). One of the other two cases was Gilligan v. Morgan, in
which the Supreme Court dismissed students’ attempts to bar the Governor of Ohio
from summoning the National Guard to subdue civil disorder at universities as a
nonjusticiable political question. 413 U.S. 1 (1973). Finally, in Nixon v. United States,
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is discussed at length throughout this article.58 In Vieth, a four-Justice
plurality determined that political gerrymandering questions are
non-justiciable.59 Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality, briefly
addressed the Baker factors, remarking that “[t]hese tests are
probably listed in descending order of both importance and
certainty.”60 Ultimately, Justice Scalia determined that only the
second Baker factor—concerning a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards—was at issue and analyzed this factor in light
of the Court’s tradition and history:
“The judicial Power” created by Article III, § 1, of the
Constitution is not whatever judges choose to do, or even
whatever Congress chooses to assign them. It is the power to
act in the manner traditional for English and American
courts. One of the most obvious limitations imposed by that
requirement is that judicial action must be governed by
standard, by rule. Laws promulgated by the Legislative
Branch can be inconsistent, illogical, and ad hoc; law
pronounced by the courts must be principled, rational, and
based upon reasoned distinctions.61
The plurality further explained that political gerrymandering
claims are non-justiciable political questions due to the absence of
“judicially manageable standards.”62
The political question doctrine raises a dichotomy that is at the
very core of redistricting cases. Elections are fundamental to our
nation’s representative democracy. Meanwhile, the judiciary is to
avoid political divisiveness and retain public trust in order to fairly
and reliably resolve disputes. Controversial political questions often
present the closest cases of judicial infringement on other branches of
government, and may present the greatest threat to faith and trust in
the judicial system as a whole.

the Supreme Court reviewed a federal judge’s claims that his impeachment trial
violated Article I, Section 3, Clause 6 of the United States Constitution, because it was
conducted by a committee of the Senate rather than by the full body. 506 U.S. 224
(1993). The Nixon Court ultimately determined that the question was political in
nature because there was a textual commitment to the Senate of the manner in which
it might “try” a federal officer for impeachment. Id. at 237.
58. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 267.
59. See id.
60. Id. at 278.
61. Id. (citation omitted).
62. Id. at 310.
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Yet, one can argue that an issue that is fundamental to the right
to suffrage is among those in greatest need of resolution by a
nonpartisan judiciary.63 Without an independent arbiter of politically
charged actions that may threaten constitutional rights or the
democratic process, the whole system would be placed at risk.64 This
dichotomy highlights why the more political a claim or controversy
becomes, the more complicated the issue is for a judicial body to
address.
Ultimately, the political question doctrine is a key consideration
in Supreme Court jurisprudence and remains arguably unresolved in
redistricting cases. As such, it must be considered with respect to any
future review of reapportionment cases.
C. Judicial Involvement in Other Highly-Politicized Matters
The Supreme Court’s recent consideration of other highlypoliticized matters further demonstrates the importance of the
political question doctrine. Moreover, these matters illustrate how
judicial involvement in political controversies can influence the
public’s faith and confidence in the judicial system, exemplifying the
importance of “judicial restraint in resolving political disputes . . . .”65
This article identifies some of the highest profile cases because they
highlight how judicial involvement in political matters is detrimental
to public perception of the Court’s impartiality and integrity.

63. See Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court Gives Partisan Gerrymandering the
Green Light—or at Least a Yellow Light, FINDLAW (May 12, 2004),
https://supreme.findlaw.com/legal-commentary/the-supreme-court-givespartisan-gerrymandering-the-green-light-or-at-least-a-yellow-light.html
[https://perma.cc/8E4P-RUPX] (“It is a basic principle of American constitutional
law that in some circumstances, actors who are not politically accountable are better
positioned to make the ground rules for those who are. Thus, we generally trust the
courts to interpret the constitutional ground rules for politics because we think they
are more likely to try to do the job fairly than are self-interested political actors. Even
if the courts occasionally disappoint us by rendering what appear to be political
judgments in the name of law, we can be certain that politicians will more often
render political judgments, for that is the nature of their business.”).
64. Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1935 (2018) (Kagan, J., concurring) (“More
effectively every day, [partisan gerrymandering] enables politicians to entrench
themselves in power against the people’s will. And only the courts can do anything to
remedy the problem, because gerrymanders benefit those who control the political
branches.”).
65. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 157 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Perhaps one of the most well-known and highly-contentious
cases in which the judiciary became entangled in politics is Bush v.
Gore,66 which arguably cost the Supreme Court significant legitimacy
in the eyes of the public. Bush v. Gore concerned the 2000 presidential
election between George W. Bush and Albert Gore, Jr., and involved
the Supreme Court analyzing a ruling by the Florida Supreme Court
on vote recount procedures.67 The issue arose after several of
Florida’s ballots were improperly punctured, resulting in “hanging
chads.”68 The Florida Supreme Court ordered a recount of the votes,
with recounted votes being evaluated according to the “intent of the
voter.”69
On review, the Supreme Court answered the question of
“whether the Florida Supreme Court established new standards for
resolving Presidential election contests, thereby violating Art. II, § 1,
cl. 2, of the United States Constitution and failing to comply with 3
U.S.C. § 5, and whether the standardless manual recounts violates the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.”70 The decision clearly
divided the “conservative” and “liberal” wings of the Court. The
majority ultimately identified a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause and determined that the appropriate remedy was to order an
end to the recount, rather than order a new recount under established
procedures.71 As a result, George W. Bush was identified as the winner
of the electoral vote and sworn in as President, after a close election
resolved by the United States Supreme Court on grounds some
perceived to be partisan rather than legal in nature.72
The Court’s acceptance of certiorari in Bush v. Gore exposed it to
significant public scrutiny on two grounds that bear on other
politically charged issues: (1) whether the Court had the legal
authority to hear the case; and (2) whether the Court should have
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 104. See generally Samantha Levine, Hanging Chads: As the Florida
Recount Implodes, the Supreme Court Decides Bush v. Gore, US NEWS (Jan. 17, 2008),
https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2008/01/17/the-legacy-of-hangingchads [https://perma.cc/G592-Q4XB].
69. Bush, 531 U.S. at 105.
70. Id. at 103.
71. Id.
72. See Jakob Brecheisen, Bush v. Gore: Can the Supreme Court’s Most Political
Case Prevent Russian Hacking of Voting Machines?, MINN . L. REV. (Apr. 1, 2018),
http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/2018/04/bush-v-gore/
[https://perma.cc/VV54-JLJP].
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granted certiorari given its political implications.73 In its per curiam
decision, the Court’s majority briefly acknowledged these concerns,
stating that:
Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances,
for the problem of equal protection in election processes
generally presents many complexities.
The question before the Court is not whether local entities,
in the exercise of their expertise, may develop different
systems for implementing elections. Instead, we are
presented with a situation where a state court with the
power to assure uniformity has ordered a statewide recount
with minimal procedural safeguards. When a court orders a
statewide remedy, there must be at least some assurance
that the rudimentary requirements of equal treatment and
fundamental fairness are satisfied.
....
None are more conscious of the vital limits on judicial
authority than are the Members of this Court, and none
stand more in admiration of the Constitution’s design to
leave the selection of the President to the people, through
their legislatures, and to the political sphere. When
contending parties invoke the process of the courts,
however, it becomes our unsought responsibility to resolve
the federal and constitutional issues the judicial system has
been forced to confront.74
Thus, the Court seemed to focus its responsibility to hear the
appeal on the fact that lower courts’ processes were at issue, and on
that basis, stopped the recount.75
However, the dissenting Justices argued extensively that because
the case involved a presidential election rather than a “fundamental
constitutional principle,”76 courts should not risk negatively
impacting the reputation of the Court by gratuitously inserting
themselves into questions of a political nature77:
73. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Bush v. Gore Was Not Justiciable, 76 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1093, 1094 (2001).
74. Bush, 531 U.S. at 109, 111.
75. Id. at 98–101 (per curiam) and 135 (Souter, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 157 (Breyer, S., dissenting).
77. As stated by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, “‘[m]aybe the Court should have
said, ‘We’re not going to take it, goodbye.’” Jeffry Toobin, Justice O’Connor Regrets, NEW
YORKER (May 6, 2013), https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/justiceoconnor-regrets [https://perma.cc/74S4-T3JB]. “The case, she said, . . . ‘stirred up the
public’ and ‘gave the Court a less than perfect reputation.’” Id.
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[I]n this highly politicized matter, the appearance of a split
decision runs the risk of undermining the public’s
confidence in the Court itself. That confidence is a public
treasure. . . . It is a vitally necessary ingredient of any
successful effort to protect basic liberty and, indeed the rule
of law itself. . . .
I fear that in order to bring this agonizingly long election
process to a definitive conclusion, we have not adequately
attended to that necessary “check upon our own exercise of
power,” “our own sense of self-restraint.” Justice Brandeis
once said of the Court, “The most important thing we do is
not doing.” What it does today, the Court should have left
undone.78
Similarly, Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinion further highlighted
the impact of the Bush v. Gore ruling on the national perception of the
judicial branch of government:
[The] position [of] the majority of this Court can only lend
credence to the most cynical appraisal of the work of judges
throughout the land. It is confidence in the men and women
who administer the judicial system that is the true backbone
of the rule of law. Time will one day heal the wound to that
confidence that will be inflicted by today’s decision. One
thing, however, is certain. Although we may never know
with complete certainty the identity of the winner of this
year’s Presidential election, the identity of the loser is
perfectly clear. It is the Nation’s confidence in the judge as
an impartial guardian of the rule of law.79
Criticism of the Court’s foray into political waters in Bush v. Gore
underscores the credibility the Supreme Court lost in rendering its
decision.80 The Bush decision highlights the strong divide over when
to grant review, and how judicial authority should be exercised in the
context of elections.
Bush v. Gore is not the only case that drew criticism for entangling
judicial and political responsibilities. In Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission, the Supreme Court struck down limits on
78. Bush, 531 U.S. at 157–58 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
79. Id. at 128–129 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
80. See Chemerinsky, supra note 73, at 1106 (“Bush v. Gore obviously cost the
Supreme Court enormously in terms of its credibility. Over forty-nine million people
voted for Al Gore, and undoubtedly virtually all of them regard the Court’s decision as
a partisan ruling by a Republican majority in favor of the Republican candidate. Few
cases, if any, in American history have been more widely perceived as partisan than
Bush v. Gore.”).

2019]

PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING

17

corporations’ political campaign expenditures on the basis that
corporations have the right to free speech under the First
Amendment.81 Many have criticized Justice Kennedy’s majority
opinion in the Supreme Court’s five-to-four decision, particularly
because the majority consisted of those Justices frequently identified
as the conservative wing of the Court.
Constitutional scholar Ronald Dworkin called the decision
“devastating,” asserting that “the decision will further weaken the
quality and fairness of our politics” and can “stand beside the Court’s
2000 decision in Bush v. Gore as an unprincipled political act with
terrible consequences for the nation.”82 Richard Hasen criticized the
majority opinion as judicial activism “sound[ing] more like the
rantings of a right-wing talk show host than the rational view of a
justice with a sense of political realism.”83 While such strong opinions
are not necessarily avoidable, the nature and stridency of these
criticisms are now more common in politically-charged cases.
Several years later, in National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius, the Supreme Court, in yet another five-to-four
decision, upheld President Obama’s Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act.84 The Court upheld the law’s requirement that most
Americans obtain insurance or pay a penalty was authorized by
Congress’s power to levy taxes.85 This time, however, the five-to-four
split consisted of Chief Justice John G. Roberts joining the four Justices
who were considered part of the liberal wing of the Court. 86 This
decision also drew criticism for being political, with critics stating that
the Chief Justice “acted less like a judge than like a politician, and a
slippery one.”87

81.
82.

558 U.S. 310 (2010).
Ronald Dworkin, The “Devastating” Decision, THE N.Y. REVIEW OF B OOKS (Feb.
25,
2010),
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2010/02/25/the-devastatingdecision/ [https://perma.cc/7LJE-RA5F]. Richard Hasen is a nationally recognized
expert in election law and campaign finance.
83. Richard L. Hasen, The Supreme Court Kills Campaign Finance Reform, SLATE
(Jan. 21, 2010), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2010/01/the-supreme-courtkills-campaign-finance-reform-in-citizens-united.html
[https://perma.cc/58HHPU4G].
84. 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
85. Id.
86. See id.
87. Ramesh Ponnuru, In Health-Care Ruling, Roberts Writes His Own Law,
BLOOMBERG (June 28, 2012), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2012-
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These entanglements of the federal judiciary in highly-political
cases are almost sure to influence the public’s perception of a
supposed nonpartisan judiciary—the branch of government tasked
with the responsibility of being an independent arbiter of the rule of
law. This perceived politicization has only increased over time. The
recent confirmation proceedings of Justice Brett Kavanaugh further
contributed to—and for some, confirmed the existence of—a partisan
division within the Supreme Court.88 In pointed testimony before the
Senate Judiciary Committee, now-Justice Kavanaugh described the
sexual assault allegations against him as “a calculated and
orchestrated political hit, fueled with apparent pent-up anger about
President Trump and the 2016 election” and “[r]evenge on behalf of
the Clintons.”89 Justice Kavanaugh’s denunciation of a particular
political party could reinforce perceptions that the Supreme Court is
further wavering from its roots as a nonpartisan, unbiased observer,
particularly during a time when the Court already appears to be
sharply split on liberal and conservative lines.90 Such partisan
06-28/in-health-care-ruling-roberts-writes-his-own-law [https://perma.cc/64FZKEKS].
88. See Ronald Brownstein, Brett Kavanaugh is Patient Zero, THE ATLANTIC (Oct.
1, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/10/kavanaughspartisanship-threatens-supreme-court/571702/ [https://perma.cc/WUN7-F3ZR]
(“That would create a stark equation for Roberts, who must surely realize that much–
perhaps most–of the nation would question the validity of every 5–4 party-line
decision in which Kavanaugh would provide the deciding vote. In the past, fear of
further eroding the Court’s legitimacy has provided a limited (though hardly uniform)
check on Roberts’s willingness to force major decisions on party-line votes. But if the
Senate confirms Kavanaugh, it will present Roberts with a justice whose every
decision will be viewed through the lens of the partisan and tribal animosities he
inflamed to defend his nomination.”).
89. Kavanaugh hearing: Transcript, WASH. P OST (Sept. 27, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/national/wp/2018/09/27/kavanaughhearing-transcript/ [https://perma.cc/74MR-9DCC].
90. See Brownstein, supra note 88 (“Kavanaugh’s behavior has irrevocably
marked his . . . tenure on the Court. With such a partisan route as his pathway, a Justice
Kavanaugh would arrive at the Supreme Court as a patient zero, carrying a virus of
illegitimacy to its decisions. Since Kavanaugh declared his hostility to the Democratic
Party and the left so openly and with such ferocity, it has seemed inevitable that tens
of millions of Americans will never see him as an impartial judge.”); Tessa Berenson,
How this Brutal Confirmation Process Could Shape Brett Kavanaugh as a Supreme Court
Justice, TIME (Oct. 2, 2018), http://time.com/5409739/brett-kavanaugh-supremecourt-justice-process/ [https://perma.cc/QNM6-PJ2F] (“Blaming Democrats for his
ordeal could be a sign that Kavanaugh would carry that anger to the high court and
stay rigidly with the Justices nominated by Republican presidents.”).
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divisiveness within the judiciary is troubling. As Justice Elena Kagan
once explained, “The court’s strength as an institution of American
governance depends on people . . . believing that it is not simply an
extension of politics, that its decision-making has a kind of integrity to
it. . . . And if people don’t believe that they have no reason to accept
what the court does.”91
As partisan ideologies continue to diverge, even moderate
judicial involvement in partisan politics will seemingly undermine
necessary separation of the three branches of government. This is
because such involvement weakens the judiciary by politicizing it,
which then collaterally weakens the political branches of government
when the judiciary interferes. Accordingly, there are lessons to be
learned from decisions like Bush v. Gore, and the judiciary should
continue to be cognizant of when judicial restraint in resolving
political disputes is necessary.
Nevertheless, simply avoiding cases or controversies with a
strong political component altogether may abdicate the judiciary’s
power to serve as a reasonable check on elected government.
Ultimately, the struggle between the judiciary’s function to serve as a
check on the other branches of government while also maintaining
judicial independence and integrity is at the focal point of
gerrymandering claims.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT IN REDISTRICTING
The Supreme Court’s reluctance to address political issues,
accompanied by the consequences that result when the judiciary
takes on such politically charged issues, helps explain why the judicial
branch has struggled to face the issue of partisan gerrymandering
head-on.
This section addresses the nature of the redistricting process, the
history of the Supreme Court’s decision-making in gerrymandering
cases, and how its decision-making has led to the current form of
partisan gerrymandering seen today. Further, this section takes
account of the Court’s expressed doubts on crafting a justiciable
standard on gerrymandering while taking a closer look at the limited
scope under which a claimant may achieve standing, before ultimately
91. Mark Sherman & Jessica Gresko, Brett Kavanaugh’s Attack on Democrats
Could Pose Risk to Supreme Court, CBS NEWS (Sept. 29, 2018),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/brett-kavanaugh-attack-on-democrats-posesrisk-to-supreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/4VJ5-8DLL].
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raising the question of whether the Court will ever review a partisan
gerrymandering case on the merits.
A. Primacy of the Legislature in Redistricting
In Reynolds v. Sims, the Court clarified that the dimensions of a
state’s electoral districts are unquestionably a political matter in the
first instance.92 Authority to draw district maps is explicitly given to
state legislatures by the Constitution.93 Specifically, Article I, Section
4 of the United States Constitution provides: “The Times, Places and
Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall
be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations,
except as to the Places of chusing Senators.”94 Consistent with this
Constitutional provision, Justice Scalia, in Vieth, noted Congress’s
“initial power to draw districts for federal elections . . . .”95 Further,
the Court has regularly stated that state legislatures are best equipped
for the task of redistricting.96
B. Redistricting as an Important Equal Protection Concern, with
Practical Impacts
Despite the reticence to address redistricting in some instances,
the courts have regularly found themselves acting as a check on the
legislative branch with respect to redistricting cases and
controversies. The judiciary’s involvement in redistricting can
generally be traced back to Baker v. Carr.97 In that case, the Supreme
Court held that equal protection challenges to state legislature-drawn

92. 377 U.S. 533, 586 (1977) (“[L]egislative reapportionment is primarily a
matter for legislative consideration and determination . . . .”).
93. U.S. C ONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
94. Id. art I, § 4 (emphasis added).
95. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 275 (2004).
96. See Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 101 (1997) (“The task of redistricting is
best left to state legislatures, elected by the people and as capable as the courts, if not
more so, in balancing the myriad factors and traditions in legitimate districting
policies.”); see also Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 414–15 (1977) (quoting Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586 (1964)) (“We have repeatedly emphasized that ‘legislative
reapportionment is primarily a matter for legislative consideration and
determination,’ for a state legislature is the institution that is by far the best situated
. . . .”).
97. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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electoral maps are important and justiciable.98 This fundamental
principle was further reinforced and expanded in Reynolds v. Sims, in
which the Court noted that despite the primacy of the legislature in
redistricting:
The right to vote freely for the candidate of one’s choice is of
the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on
that right strike at the heart of representative government.
And the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or
dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as
by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.99
Because even state legislatures must satisfy the “one person, one
vote” standard of the Fourteenth Amendment, state and federal
courts—as well as judicial panels around the country—find
themselves deeply and increasingly involved in the political process
and controversy of redistricting. Courts have served an important role
in redistricting, either when the state legislature fails to legislate a
new redistricting map after the decennial census is completed, or
when a districting plan potentially violates the United States
Constitution and undermines the right of suffrage.100
This line of cases, going back more than fifty years, underscores
two important points. First, the Court has always struggled with the
politicized role it may appear to play in redistricting cases.101 Second,
the Court has found that the “one person, one vote” principle is too
important to defer if the legislature does not complete timely
redistricting, or if it acts improperly with respect to drawing district
lines.102
98. Id. at 187–88 (“The complaint[] alleg[es] that . . . these plaintiffs and others
similarly situated, are denied the equal protection of the laws accorded them by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States by virtue of the
debasement of their votes . . . .”).
99. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) (footnote omitted).
100. See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 447
(2006); Hippert v. Richie, 813 N.W.2d 374, 378 (Minn. 2012); see also Wise v.
Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 540 (1978) (“Legislative bodies should not leave their
reapportionment tasks to the federal courts; but when those with legislative
responsibilities do not respond, or the imminence of a state election makes it
impractical for them to do so, it becomes the ‘unwelcome obligation’ of the federal
court to devise and impose a reapportionment plan pending later legislative action.”)
(citation omitted).
101. See, e.g., Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018); League of United Latin Am.
Citizens, 548 U.S. at 399; Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004); Davis v. Bandemer,
478 U.S. 109 (1986); Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 533.
102. See, e.g., Vieth, 541 U.S. at 267; Davis, 478 U.S. at 109;
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Independent analysis highlights the importance of assessing
whether redistricting impinges on an individual’s right to vote,
illustrating the extent to which redistricting controlled by one
particular political party increases that party’s opportunity to
maintain or increase seats in future elections. For example, a study
completed by the Associated Press demonstrated that in the 2016
election, “gerrymandered” maps gave Republicans a significant
advantage.103 The study found that Republicans won as many as
twenty-two more seats in the House of Representatives than would
be expected “based on the average vote share in congressional
districts across the country.”104 In states such as Michigan, South
Dakota, Wisconsin, Florida, and North Carolina, Republican controlled
legislatures drew district maps that produced more Republican
representatives than statewide voting percentages would predict.105
In addition to skewed representation, gerrymandering harms
democracy by making too many districts noncompetitive. In 2004,
only six percent of House of Representative seats were decided with
a vote share in the range of fifty-five to forty-five percent,106 and fewer
than fifty of the 435 seats were “seriously contested” that year.107
Both numbers were a distinct drop-off from historical norms.108 One
consequence of the non-competitive districts is an increase in
polarization, creating “safe seats in which incumbents have strong
incentives to reflect the views of their party’s most extreme
supporters—i.e., those active in primary elections—and little reason
to reach out to swing voters.”109
These statistics demonstrate the extent to which the outcomes of
elections can be affected or even manipulated by drawing legislative
boundaries to favor a political party’s own interests and the general,
overall impact of gerrymandering on elections. Thus, the importance
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 533.
103. David A. Lieb, AP Analysis Shows How Gerrymandering Benefited GOP in 2016,
AP
NEWS
(June
27,
2017),
https://www.apnews.com/e3c5cc51faba4b7fb67d8a3f996bdaca
[https://perma.cc/B8ZP-2LUS].
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Thomas E. Mann, Redistricting Reform, THE NAT’L V OTER (June 2005),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/p04-07.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SJW7-4YVC].
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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of redistricting outcomes is reinforced by both Supreme Court
findings regarding the Equal Protection suffrage protections, and
statistical analyses underscoring the practical impacts of
“gerrymandered” maps. However, as with any matter, a redistricting
case must meet certain thresholds before a court will pass judgment
on it.
C. Thresholds for Review of Justiciable Redistricting Cases
1. A party must have standing to contest a redistricting map.
A plaintiff must have “a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy” in order to bring a redistricting case before a federal
court.110 This requires a plaintiff to have suffered an injury in “a
personal and individual way.”111 A person’s right to vote is “individual
and personal in nature,”112 so, if a voter can show that his or her right
to vote has been harmed, he or she has standing to sue.
Historically, the Court has held that plaintiffs can establish
standing to sue in gerrymandering cases by proving that they live in
the challenged district. In Baker v. Carr, for example, the Court held
that the plaintiffs had standing because they claimed the map
“disfavor[ed] the voters in the counties in which they reside[d].”113 In
other cases, such as Bandemer and Vieth, the plurality opinions did not
directly address standing.114 But in those cases, the plaintiffs lived
within the challenged districts.115
Conversely, in a 1995 racial gerrymandering case, the Court
rejected the plaintiffs’ objections to a redistricting map because they
“d[id] not live in the district that [was] the primary focus” of the claim
and, accordingly, they lacked standing.116 Further, the partisan
gerrymandering plaintiffs in Gill based their claim entirely on a

110. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
111. Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1929 (2018) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
112. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561 (1977).
113. Baker, 369 U.S. at 208.
114. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109
(1986)..
115. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 115; Vieth, 541 U.S. at 272.
116. United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 739, 744–45 (1995) (“Where a plaintiff
resides in a racially gerrymandered district . . . the plaintiff has been denied equal
treatment . . . . On the other hand, where a plaintiff does not live in such a district, he
or she does not suffer those special harms . . . .”).
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statewide injury, which harmed Democrats’ collective representation
in the state legislature. At the trial, “not a single plaintiff sought to
prove that he or she lives in a cracked or packed district.” 117
Therefore, the Court held that the plaintiffs’ case was “about group
political interests, not individual legal rights.”118 As discussed later,
this standing requirement bears directly on whether the judiciary will
take on a politicized case.119
2. Established standards for assessing population and racial
gerrymandering.
As previously noted, in Baker v. Carr, the Court reasoned that
“[j]udicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause are well
developed and familiar, and it has been open to courts since the
enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to determine . . . that a
discrimination reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious
action.”120 This was reiterated in Davis v. Bandemer, where the Court
again noted that Fourteenth Amendment claims were frequently
brought to the Court and it knew how to address them.121 Similarly,
other cases deployed specific standards to assess various claims of
unconstitutional redistricting.122 Accordingly, when standing exists,
the judiciary has addressed redistricting disputes by accepting one of
two primary roles (and sometimes both): (1) drawing district maps
when legislatures fail to do so; or (2) adjudicating disputes over maps
drawn by political bodies.

117. Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1932 (2018).
118. Id. at 1933.
119. See infra Section III.C.3.
120. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962) (emphasis added).
121. 478 U.S. 109, 125–27 (1986).
122. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995) (“The plaintiff’s burden
is to show . . . that race was the predominant factor motivating the legislature’s
decision to place a significant number of voters within or without a particular
district.”); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 644 (1993) (“[R]edistricting . . . that is so
bizarre on its face that it is ‘unexplainable on grounds other than race,’ demands the
same close scrutiny that we give other state laws that classify citizens by race.”
(quoting Vill. Of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266
(1977)); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 731 (1983) (“If . . . plaintiffs can establish
that the population differences were not the result of a good-faith effort to achieve
equality, the State must bear the burden of proving that each significant variance
between districts was necessary to achieve some legitimate goal.”).
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a. Court-drawn redistricting maps.
The first of those two roles, judicial drawing of district maps,
presents courts with “the unwelcome obligation of performing in the
legislature’s stead . . . .”123 This role was once unthinkable. For
example, when the Illinois legislature failed to update its
congressional districts to reflect population changes in 1946,
petitioners asked the Supreme Court to do so.124 However, the Court
considered it out of the question: “Of course no court can affirmatively
remap the Illinois districts so as to bring them more in conformity
with the standards of fairness for a representative system. At best we
could only declare the existing electoral system invalid.”125
That began to change following Baker, as it became clear that
states would still need to hold elections after courts struck down their
congressional maps but could not proceed with a district plan ruled
unconstitutional.126 Eventually, in 1965, the Supreme Court
acknowledged that the judiciary’s power “to formulate a valid
redistricting plan has not only been recognized by this Court but
appropriate action by the States in such cases has been specifically
encouraged.”127 In the decades since, this practice has become
common when courts grant relief to plaintiffs who bring claims that
the map from the prior census no longer serves the “one person, one
vote” principle following the decennial census, and the legislature has
either failed to draw a new map or it appears there is insufficient time
for the legislature to draw such a map prior to the first major election
after the census results are published.128 Plaintiffs in these cases are
frequently voters who claim violations of the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the state or federal constitution and
are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In states like Minnesota—where

123. Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 415 (1977).
124. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
125. Id. at 553. Pre-Baker, the Court held that it could not even declare the system
invalid because doing so would interfere with Congress’s role. See id. at 556.
126. See Md. Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656, 676 (1964)
(holding that Maryland courts should step in “if the legislature fails to enact a
constitutionally valid state legislative apportionment scheme in a timely fashion . . .
under no circumstances should the 1966 election . . . be conducted pursuant to the
existing or any other unconstitutional plan.”); see also Scranton v. Drew, 379 U.S. 40,
41 (1964).
127. Scott v. Germano, 381 U.S. 407, 409 (1965).
128. See Sara N. Nordstand, The “Unwelcome Obligation”: Why Neither State Nor
Federal Courts Should Draw District Lines, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1997, 2005 (2018).
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the state legislature regularly fails to agree upon a new district map
following the decennial census—the state supreme court consistently
draws congressional and legislative maps.129
Despite the Supreme Court’s anxiety over accepting political
cases and addressing political questions, state and federal courts have
found ways to establish standards for the drawing of fair maps, and to
draw maps that do not result in further legal challenge, when called to
do so. Their approaches are informative to the extent courts feel
compelled to address redistricting claims, but do not wish to release
or enable a map that is intentionally—or even accidently—partisan.
Indeed, Minnesota’s own history provides an illustrative example
that informs the consideration of partisan gerrymandering standards
later in this article. The Chief Justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court
has the authority, under sections 2.724, subdivision 1, and 480.16 of
the Minnesota Statutes, to appoint a special redistricting panel if the
state legislature and governor are unable to enact a congressional
redistricting plan within a statutorily provided timeframe.130 In 2001,
then-Chief Justice Kathleen Blatz of the Minnesota Supreme Court was
petitioned to appoint such a panel—the first Minnesota Special
Redistricting Panel—to oversee all of Minnesota’s 2001–02
redistricting litigation.131 After the Minnesota legislature failed to
complete congressional and legislative redistricting activities by the
statutory deadline, the redistricting panel of five judges addressed the
constitutionality of Minnesota’s congressional election districts and
adopted a redistricting plan that was considered “fundamentally fair

129. See Hippert v. Richie, 813 N.W.2d 374, 378 (Minn. 2012) (“The ordinary
remedy for this constitutional defect is for the Minnesota Legislature to redraw the
state’s senate and house districts to better reflect the state’s population. . . . [The]
statutory deadline has arrived, and the Legislature and Governor have not enacted a
legislative redistricting plan. Therefore, it is the role of the state judicial branch to
prepare a valid legislative plan and order its adoption.”) (citation omitted).
130. MINN. STAT. §§ 2.724, subdiv. 1, 480.16; see also Hippert, 813 N.W.2d at 379
(“Traditional redistricting is performed through the legislative process, and the
redistricting plan is enacted into law only after it is passed by the Legislature and
signed by the Governor.”); Zachman v. Kiffmeyer, 629 N.W.2d 98, 98 (Minn. 2001)
(ordering “that the special redistricting panel shall release a redistricting plan . . . only
in the event a legislative redistricting plan is not enacted in a timely manner.”).
131. Zachman v. Kiffmeyer, C0-01-160, at 1 (Minn. Special Redistricting Panel
Mar. 19, 2002) (Final Order Adopting a Congressional Redistricting Plan), available
at
http://www.mncourts.gov/mncourtsgov/media/CIOMediaLibrary/2001Redistricti
ng/Final_Congressional_Order.PDF [https://perma.cc/4F7L-B2SM].
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and based primarily on the state’s population and secondarily on
neutral districting principles.”132
With respect to population, the parties stipulated that “[t]he
districts must be as nearly equal in population as is practicable.
Because a court-ordered redistricting plan must conform to a higher
standard of population equality than a legislative redistricting plan,
absolute population equality will be the goal.”133 The neutral
redistricting principles, which were also stipulated to by the parties,
helped guide the redistricting panel in compiling a redistricting plan
that satisfied both constitutional and statutory requirements. 134
Further, these politically neutral redistricting principles were meant
to “advance the interests of the collective public good and preserve
the public’s confidence and perception of fairness in the redistricting
process.”135 The redistricting principles considered by the panel
included the following:
 Contiguity and Compactness: “Districts will consist of
convenient, contiguous territory structured into compact
units. . . . Districts with areas that connect at only a single
point will be considered noncontiguous.”136
132. Id. at 4. For access to all orders and other documents related to the 2001
Special Redistricting Panel visit http://www.mncourts.gov/Media/Historic-HighProfile-Cases/Special-Redistricting-Panel-2001.aspx
[https://perma.cc/MY7XLB4C].
133. Id. at 2 (Minn. Special Redistricting Panel Dec. 11, 2001) (Order Stating
Redistricting Principles and Requirements for Plan Submissions) (internal citation
omitted),
available
at
http://www.mncourts.gov/mncourtsgov/media/CIOMediaLibrary/2001Redistricti
ng/Criteria_Order.pdf [https://perma.cc/LG42-G6U6].
134. Id. at 2 (Minn. Special Redistricting Panel July 12, 2001) (Chief Justice Blatz’s
Redistricting
Order),
available
at
http://www.mncourts.gov/mncourtsgov/media/CIOMediaLibrary/2001Redistricti
ng/Blatz_JulyOrder.pdf [https://perma.cc/S5PX-JFWZ]; Zachman, C0-01-160 (Minn.
Special Redistricting Panel Mar. 19, 2002) (Final Order Adopting a Congressional
Redistricting
Plan),
available
at
http://www.mncourts.gov/mncourtsgov/media/CIOMediaLibrary/2001Redistricti
ng/Final_Congressional_Order.PDF [https://perma.cc/4F7L-B2SM].
135. Hippert v. Ritchie, 813 N.W.2d 374, 379 (Minn. Special Redistricting Panel
Feb. 21, 2012).
136. Zachman, C0-01-160, at 2 (Minn. Special Redistricting Panel Dec. 11, 2001)
(Order Stating Redistricting Principles and Requirements for Plan Submissions).
“Contiguity” has been explained as “[a]ll parts of a district being connected at some
point with the rest of the district,” whereas “compactness” has been described as
“[h]aving the minimum distance between all the parts of a constituency (a circle,
square or a hexagon is the most compact district).” Redistricting Criteria, NAT’L

28

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW SUA SPONTE

[Vol. 45:5



Preserve Communities of Interest: “Communities of
interest will be preserved where possible . . . . For
purposes of this principle, ‘communities of interest’
include, but are not limited to, groups of Minnesota
citizens with clearly recognizable similarities of social,
geographic, political, cultural, ethnic, economic, or other
interests.”137
 Preserve counties and other political subdivisions: “The
districts will be drawn with attention to county, city, and
township boundaries. A county, city, or township will not
be divided into more than one district except as
necessary to meet equal population requirements or to
form districts that are composed of convenience,
contiguous, and compact territory. When any county,
city, or township must be divided into one or more
districts, it will be divided into as few districts as
possible.”138
 Not Drawn for Purpose of Defeating Incumbents: “Districts
may not be drawn for the purpose of protecting or
defeating an incumbent. However, as a factor
subordinate to all redistricting criteria, the panel may
view a proposed plan’s effect on incumbents to
determine whether the plan results in either undue
incumbent protection or excessive incumbent
conflicts.”139
Similarly, in 2012, a Minnesota Special Redistricting Panel of five
judges (“2012 Panel”) drew a new state congressional and legislative
district map following the 2010 U.S. Census, when the legislature
again failed to do so by an established deadline.140 The criteria used
was much the same as the criteria used by the 2001 Minnesota Special
Redistricting Panel, but with an additional specified criterion
addressing the preservation of political subdivisions: “[p]olitical
subdivisions shall not be divided more than necessary to meet

CONFERENCE
OF
STATE
LEGISLATURES
(June
14,
2018),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/redistricting/redistricting-criteria.aspx
[https://perma.cc/3BU6-Q5HN].
137. Zachman, C0-01-160, at 3 (Minn. Special Redistricting Panel Dec. 11, 2001)
(Order Stating Redistricting Principles and Requirements for Plan Submissions).
138. Id. at 2–3.
139. Id. at 3.
140. Hippert v. Ritchie, 813 N.W.2d 391 (Minn. 2012) (Final Order Adopting a
Congressional Redistricting Plan).
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constitutional requirements.”141 With respect to its use of neutral
redistricting criteria, the panel explained that these principles are
necessary because “[w]hen the judicial branch performs redistricting,
it lacks the political authority of the legislative and executive branches
and, therefore, must act in a restrained and deliberative manner to
accomplish the task.”142 Consistent with the panel’s recognition that
courts engaged in redistricting lack the political authority possessed
by the legislature and governor, “the plan established by the panel
[was] a least-change plan to the extent feasible.”143 Because the prior
map was considered essentially nonpartisan, the 2012 Panel felt it
unnecessary to draw a new map from scratch, instead making
minimal adjustments to the existing congressional district
boundaries.144
The 2012 Panel issued its revised map on February 21, 2012, and
the Minneapolis Star Tribune editorial board said its impression of the
map was “largely positive.”145 Others were not as supportive of the
revised map, however. For instance, then-Congressional
Representative Michele Bachmann wrote the following to supporters:
“Just as we suspected, the liberal courts have changed the makeup of
Minnesota’s Congressional districts. The courts’ liberal bias was
evident by cherry-picking the districts and going so far as to draw my
141. Hippert v. Ritchie, A11-152 (Minn. Special Redistricting Panel Nov. 4, 2011)
(Order Stating Redistricting Principles and Requirements for Plan Submissions)
available
at
http://www.mncourts.gov/mncourtsgov/media/CIOMediaLibrary/2011Redistricti
ng/A110152Order11-4-11.pdf [https://perma.cc/83QE-DBZU].
142. Hippert, 813 N.W.2d at 395 (citing Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 415, (1977)
(stating that courts lack the “political authoritativeness” that legislatures bring to
redistricting and that a court’s task “is inevitably an exposed and sensitive one that
must be accomplished circumspectly, and in a manner free from any taint of
arbitrariness or discrimination”)); see Perry v. Perez, 565 U.S. 388, 393 (2012) (per
curiam) (stating that “redistricting ordinarily involves criteria and standards that
have been weighed and evaluated by the elected branches in the exercise of their
political judgment” and that courts are “ill suited” to make such policy judgments).
143. Hippert, 813 N.W.2d at 397.
144. Id. at 398.
145. Editorial, Credit Judges for Fair Representation, STAR TRIBUNE (Feb. 22, 2012),
http://www.startribune.com/editorial-credit-judges-for-fairrepresentation/139913633/ [https://perma.cc/Y6MB-Z4WK]; see Chris Steller,
Redistricting Draws Reformers but Some Say Process Worked Fine Last Time, TWIN
CITIES DAILY PLANET (May 24, 2009), https://www.tcdailyplanet.net/redistrictingdraws-reformers-some-say-process-worked-fine-last-time/
[https://perma.cc/H884-WJV4].
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home . . . outside the new sixth district.”146 However, neither the 2002
nor 2012 redistricting maps presented by the Minnesota Special
Redistricting Panels drew appeals, and overall reviews of the map
were largely positive.147 Further, the focus on neutral redistricting
criteria, while using political considerations solely as a check to
ensure the new map did not lean too far in either direction, appears
to have helped public perception of the 2012 Panel’s final decision. 148
As another example, in January 2018, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court found the state’s Congressional Redistricting Act of 2011
unconstitutional due to extreme partisan gerrymander, and enjoined
its use in upcoming May 2018 primary elections.149 To remedy the
situation, the court directed that, should the Pennsylvania General
Assembly choose to submit a congressional district plan that satisfies
the requirements of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and should such
plan be accepted by the governor, it must then be submitted to the
court for review.150 The court also offered the opportunity for parties
and intervenors to submit proposed remedial districting plans to the
court for consideration.151 The court specified that any remedial
congressional districting plan, whether submitted by parties or
intervenors or enacted by the legislature and governor, must consist
of “congressional districts composed of compact and contiguous
territory; as nearly equal in population as practicable; and which do
not divide any county, city, incorporated town, borough, township, or
ward, except where necessary to ensure equality of population.” 152
Ultimately, the General Assembly was unable to pass legislation
for the governor’s approval, making it the judiciary’s responsibility to
create an appropriate redistricting plan.153 The court considered

146. Brian Lambert, Bachmann Not Pleased With ‘Liberal Courts’ on Redistricting,
MINNP OST (Feb. 22, 2012), https://www.minnpost.com/glean/2012/02/bachmannnot-pleased-liberal-courts-redistricting [https://perma.cc/A4NX-3JWU].
147. Credit Judges for Fair Representation, supra note 145.
148. Credit Judges for Fair Representation, supra note 145 (praising the “evenhandedness of the five-judge panel’s work, befitting their mixed political pedigrees”).
149. League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 175 A.3d 282, 284 (Pa. 2018)
(per curiam), cert. denied sub nom; see Turzai v. Brandt, 139 S. Ct. 445 (2018).
150. League of Women Voters, 175 A.3d at 284.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 181 A.3d 1083 (Pa. 2018). The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that this was within its constitutional authority
and responsibility, as under Pennsylvania law, “[w]hen the legislature is unable or
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proposed remedial districting plans submitted by other parties,
intervenors, and amici, and chose a plan that was “composed of
congressional districts which follow the traditional redistricting
criteria of compactness, contiguity, equality of population, and
respect for the integrity of political subdivisions.”154 The court itself
redrew the state’s congressional district lines and issued a remedial
congressional map.155
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s action drew both criticism
and praise. Election experts said the Pennsylvania map “appear[ed] to
be tilted toward neither political party,” and that it “look[ed] more like
a 9-to-9 division of the state.”156 However, some politicians were not
all so pleased. A state senator complained: “Implementation of this
map would create a constitutional crisis where the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court is usurping the authority of the legislative and
executive branches. . . . This map illustrates that the definition of fair
is simply code for a desire to elect more Democrats.”157 Pennsylvania
Governor Tom Wolf, on the other hand, “applaud[ed] the court for
their decision and respect[ed] their effort to remedy Pennsylvania’s
unfair and unequal congressional elections.”158
There is no doubt that courts addressing redistricting maps have
drawn criticism from both sides of the aisle, given that this is “one of
the most intense inter-branch conflicts that our constitutional system
allows. . . . [T]he affected parties will analyze each decision a court
makes for any hint of bias . . . .”159 As such, it is nearly impossible for
any redistricting map to avoid all criticism.160 Likewise, it is possible
for judicially-constructed maps to be unfair or overly partisan, just as

chooses not to act, it becomes the judiciary’s role to ensure a valid districting scheme.”
Id. at 1122 n.6.
154. Id. at 1087.
155. Id. at 1087–89.
156. Trip Gabriel & Jess Bidgood, Court-Drawn Map in Pennsylvania May Lift
Democrats’
House
Chances,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
19,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/19/us/pennsylvania-map.html
[https://perma.cc/2TVA-GJ7K].
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Nathaniel Persily, When Judges Carve Democracies: A Primer on Court-Drawn
Redistricting Plans, PENN LAW: LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY 16 (2005),
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/74/
[https://perma.cc/EUW7-AGKC].
160. Id. at 17 (“No redistricting plan—and certainly no court plan under exigent
circumstances—is perfect.”).
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it is possible for maps drawn by a state legislature to cross party lines
or to be partisan but reasonably fair. The above examples indicate,
however, that it may be possible for courts to draw redistricting maps
that do not broadly undermine faith in the judiciary, even while
acknowledging such maps always draw some critics.
b. Judicial review of legislature-drawn maps
The judiciary’s other possible role in redistricting gets more
attention: adjudication of disputes over legislature-drawn district
maps.161 Ever since Baker, courts have debated what role they can and
should have as referees in this fight, and what standards they should
use to judge a district map. However, the Court has not hesitated to
assess and strike down district maps that it finds are racial
gerrymanders.162
Unequal population claims—that is, claims that redrawn districts
do not fairly represent the population distribution—were the original
bases for gerrymandering lawsuits.163 In 1964, the Supreme Court
held that a state legislature must be apportioned according to
population.164 The Court required of state legislatures “an honest and
good faith effort to construct districts, in both houses of its legislature,
as nearly of equal population as is practicable.”165 This requirement
was rooted in the principle that “[l]egislators represent people, not
trees or acres.”166
Additionally, it is well-settled that the Equal Protection Clause
“prohibits a State, without sufficient justification, from separat[ing] its

161. See Redistricting and the Supreme Court: The Most Significant Cases, NAT’L
CONFERENCE
OF
STATE
LEGISLATURES
(Jul.
19,
2018),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/redistricting/redistricting-and-the-supreme-courtthe-most-significant-cases.aspx
[https://perma.cc/9R9D-D6SC]
(discussing
prominent cases the Supreme Court has handled concerning adjudication of
legislatively-drawn districts).
162. See Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900
(1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
163. See generally David Stebenne, Re-Mapping American Politics: The
Redistricting
Revolution
Fifty
Years
Later,
ORIGINS
(Feb.
2012),
http://origins.osu.edu/article/re-mapping-american-politics-redistrictingrevolution-fifty-years-later [https://perma.cc/K7BP-PAKT] (discussing the origin
and history of “gerrymandering”).
164. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
165. Id. at 577.
166. Id. at 562.
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citizens into different voting districts on the basis of race.” 167
Congressional districts drawn on the basis of race violate the
Constitution when: (1) ”race was the predominant factor motivating
the legislature’s decision to place a significant number of voters
within or without a particular district,”168 and (2) that racial
motivation fails to pass the court’s “strict scrutiny.”169 To meet strict
scrutiny, a state must prove that its district map is “narrowly tailored
to further a compelling governmental interest.” 170
The 2017 Supreme Court decision in Cooper v. Harris highlights
the emphasis placed on racial gerrymandering cases and the
applicable standard of review.171 In Cooper, the Court held that two
North Carolina congressional districts were unconstitutional racial
gerrymanders.172 The Court found that the state had purposefully
aimed to make those districts majority-black, “packing” AfricanAmerican voters into the two districts and limiting their influence in
the surrounding districts.173 The state admitted that race was its
primary motivating factor in one of the districts, but argued that it was
simply attempting to comply with the Voting Rights Act.174 The Court
rejected this argument, noting that the preferred candidate of AfricanAmerican voters had already consistently won that district under
previous electoral maps.175 The “packing,” therefore, was
unnecessary to give fair voice to African-American voters, and the
race-based gerrymandering failed strict scrutiny.176
In Cooper, the parties further argued that it was difficult to
separate racial motivation from partisan motivation in the drawing of
district maps because past voting data indicated a correlation
between voting preference and race.177 Indeed, the North Carolina
legislature in Cooper attempted to argue that it was merely attempting
to “pack” Democrats into the second challenged district, not African-

167. Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 797 (2017) (internal
quotations omitted).
168. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995).
169. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 653 (1993).
170. Id. at 631.
171. 137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017).
172. Id. at 1481–82.
173. Id. at 1468.
174. Id. at 1469–70.
175. Id. at 1470–71.
176. Id. at 1469–70.
177. Id. at 1473.
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Americans.178 While determining whether race or political affiliation
motivated the line-drawing is largely a factual question, the Court
explained that alleged racial gerrymandering is subject to closer
scrutiny because it “threatens special harms” that are not found in
political gerrymandering cases.179 Racial gerrymandering reinforces
racial stereotypes and tacitly tells elected officials that they represent
a racial group rather than their full constituency.180 Therefore, racial
gerrymandering is not “functionally equivalent” to political
gerrymandering and is not “subject to precisely the same
constitutional scrutiny.”181 Because political gerrymandering does
not threaten the same harms, the Court treats it differently from racial
gerrymandering.
This background illustrates the Court’s method of assessing
population and racial gerrymandering claims. However, partisan
gerrymandering presents unique challenges, not only in terms of
importance, but also in setting a workable standing threshold and
standard of review.
3. Partisan gerrymandering cases present unique challenges
Davis v. Bandemer marked the Supreme Court’s first attempt to
consider a political gerrymandering claim—almost twenty years after
Baker v. Carr.182 The plaintiffs in Bandemer argued that Indiana’s
district lines “were intended to and did violate their right, as
Democrats, to equal protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment.”183 A majority of the Court held the claim was justiciable
and that the standards for political gerrymandering cases were just as
judicially manageable as those for racial gerrymandering cases.184
However, according to the Bandemer plurality, the plaintiffs needed
“to prove both intentional discrimination against an identifiable
political group and an actual discriminatory effect on that group.”185
In a separate opinion, Justice Powell argued that the plurality’s
standard was not clear and that the Court had “fail[ed] to enunciate
178. Id.
179. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 649–50 (1993).
180. Id. at 650.
181. Id.
182. Compare Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 115 (1986), with Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 189 (1962).
183. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 115.
184. Id. at 125.
185. Id. at 127.
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standards by which to determine whether a legislature has enacted an
unconstitutional gerrymander.”186 Justice Powell’s opinion has
proven prescient: As of the writing of this article, no Supreme Court
majority has ever agreed upon a standard for unconstitutional
political gerrymandering, and the Court has never held that a district
map constituted an unconstitutional political gerrymander. The
Supreme Court did not revisit the Bandemer decision for eighteen
years. In the interim, the lower courts were left with the aftermath of
the Supreme Court’s inability to furnish a standard for addressing
claims of political gerrymandering.187 And the lower courts, having
considered numerous political gerrymandering claims, did not
themselves succeed in shaping a standard for determining these
claims.188
Subsequently, in 2004, a plurality of Supreme Court justices
concluded that Bandemer should be revisited and partisan
gerrymandering cases should be declared non-justiciable.189 In Vieth,
Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion acknowledged “the incompatibility of
severe partisan gerrymanders with democratic principles.”190 Even
so, Scalia’s opinion surveyed the courts’ attempts to agree on a
partisan gerrymandering standard and concluded that because none
had emerged, none must exist.191 Thus, a plurality of the Court found
in Vieth that “no judicially discernible and manageable standards for
adjudicating political gerrymandering claims have emerged. Lacking
them, we must conclude that political gerrymandering claims are
nonjusticiable . . . .”192
186. Id. at 161–62.
187. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 279 (2004).
188. Id. at 279–80. Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality in Vieth, discussed the
history of the lower courts’ political gerrymandering decisions in the eighteen year
span between Bandemer and Vieth:
Nor can it be said that the lower courts have, over 18 years, succeeded in
shaping the standard that this Court was initially unable to enunciate.
They have simply applied the standard set forth in Bandemer’s fourJustice plurality opinion. This might be thought to prove that the fourJustice plurality standard has met the test of time—but for the fact that its
application has almost invariably produced the same result (except for
the incurring of attorney’s fees) as would have obtained if the question
were nonjusticiable: Judicial intervention has been refused.
Id. (citations omitted).
189. Id. at 281.
190. Id. at 292.
191. Id. at 281.
192. Id.
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The plaintiffs and dissenters in Vieth argued that standards for
political gerrymandering are “manageable” because they can be
borrowed from cases determining that racial gerrymandering is
unconstitutional.193 Nevertheless, the plurality argued that the effects
of political gerrymandering, as opposed to racial gerrymandering, are
impossible to assess, and that creating a standard for evaluating the
effects of political gerrymandering is near impossible.194 The plurality
also specifically rejected “fairness” as a standard, finding it judicially
unmanageable: “Fairness is compatible with noncontiguous districts,
it is compatible with districts that straddle political subdivisions, and
it is compatible with a party’s not winning the number of seats that
mirrors the proportion of its vote.”195 As such, partisan
gerrymandering is not the same as more “manageable” types of
gerrymandering claims.
Despite this discussion, in and after Vieth, the Court has
continued to recognize that “[p]artisan gerrymanders . . . are
incompatible with democratic principles.”196 Given the Court’s own
past statements about the importance of congressional district
development to fair representation, the question arises: is it really
acceptable for justices on the country’s highest court to consider it
impossible to identify and remedy gerrymandering—an
acknowledged potential harm to democratic principles and the right
of suffrage? At what point, if any, should American voters accept that
the judiciary may “call it quits” on identifying a workable standard
simply because it has not yet been achieved? In doing so, is the Court
abdicating its role as a check on the legislative branch of government?
And would an imperfect standard better preserve fair representation
than no standard at all?
193. See, e.g., Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017); Bethune-Hill v. Va. State
Bd. Of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788 (2017); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Shaw
v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
194. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 287 (“But a person’s politics is rarely as readily
discernible—and never as permanently discernible—as a person’s race. Political
affiliation is not an immutable characteristic, but may shift from one election to the
next; and even within a given election, not all voters follow the party line. We dare
say (and hope) that the political party which puts forward an utterly incompetent
candidate will lose even in its registration stronghold. These facts make it impossible
to assess the effects of partisan gerrymandering, to fashion a standard for evaluating
a violation, and finally to craft a remedy.”) (emphasis in original).
195. Id. at 291.
196. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652,
2658 (2015) (citing Vieth, 541 U.S. at 292).
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These questions are particularly vexing considering that the
Supreme Court has historically been willing to address other
nebulous problems arguably less important to the underpinnings of
representative government—including whether art is an obscenity
not protected by the First Amendment,197 or whether tomatoes
should legally be considered vegetables.198 One must question
whether the Court ought to abdicate its responsibility “to say what the
law is” in cases or controversies that pose a threat to fundamental
democratic principles.199
Perhaps for these reasons, Justice Scalia’s opinion in Vieth did not
garner a majority, and Justice Kennedy refused to wholly shut the
door on political gerrymandering claims. In his concurring opinion,
Justice Kennedy argued that the fact that “no such standard has
emerged in this case should not be taken to prove that none will
emerge in the future. Where important rights are involved, the
impossibility of full analytical satisfaction is reason to err on the side
of caution.”200 Vieth left the issue unsettled; no Supreme Court
majority had yet declared political gerrymandering non-justiciable,
but neither had any majority figured out what to do about it.201
While other partisan gerrymandering cases have been brought
to, and reviewed by, the Court, the Court has to date declined to
further define a standard for justiciability or standard of review. In
League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, the Court declined
to revisit the justiciability issue, instead holding that the plaintiffs had
not offered the Court a “manageable, reliable measure of fairness for
determining whether a partisan gerrymander violates the
Constitution.”202 However, the Court did acknowledge that the
Constitution, through the First and Fourteenth Amendments, limits a
state’s power to “rely exclusively on partisan preferences in drawing

197. See, e.g., Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 191–92 (1964) (Brennan, J., writing
for the majority) (retaining the “not perfect” and “contemporary community
standards” test for identifying obscenity); id. at 197 (Stewart, J., concurring) (noting
that the Court was “trying to define what may be indefinable . . . But I know it when I
see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that.”).
198. Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304, 307 (1893).
199. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 165–66 (1803).
200. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 311 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
201. See generally id. at 279 (discussing the inability of courts to settle on a
standard for judicial action).
202. 548 U.S. 399, 414 (2006).
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district lines . . . .”203 Rather, the state has a “fundamental duty . . . to
govern impartially.”204
In the twelve years since Perry, political gerrymandering has
become one of America’s most heated political issues. In 2018, the
Supreme Court heard two partisan redistricting cases, raising
expectations that it would finally settle, or at least shed more light on,
the issue. But in both cases, the Court declined to address the
justiciability of political gerrymandering cases. In Whitford v. Gill, the
plaintiffs were Wisconsin voters who argued that the state’s
legislative map caused “statewide harm to their interest ‘in their
collective representation in the legislature,’ and in influencing the
legislature’s overall ‘composition and policymaking.’”205 Additionally,
the plaintiffs presented a measure of partisan advantage: efficiency
gaps.206
[O]n a statewide level, the degree to which packing and
cracking has favored one party over another can be
measured by a single calculation: an “efficiency gap” that
compares each party’s respective “wasted” votes across all
legislative districts. “Wasted” votes are those cast for a
losing candidate or for a winning candidate in excess of what
that candidate needs to win.207
The Gill plaintiffs promised the Court that the problem of political
gerrymandering could be solved by evaluating the efficiency gap.208
The Supreme Court did not agree, determining that the suggested
efficiency gap metrics do not “address the effect that a gerrymander
has on the votes of particular citizens.”209 The Court held that voters
must allege that the impact of their specific, individual vote—not the
votes of a group—was diluted by a district map. The Gill plaintiffs’
claim, however, did not identify “an individual and personal injury of
the kind required for Article III standing.”210 As such, the Court
203. Id. at 461.
204. Id. at 462.
205. 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (quoting Brief for Appellees at 31).
206. Id. at 1924.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1933 (“The plaintiffs and their amici curiae promise us that the
efficiency gap and similar measures of partisan asymmetry will allow the federal
courts—armed with just ‘a pencil and paper or a hand calculator’—to finally solve the
problem of partisan gerrymandering that has confounded the Court for decades.”
(quoting Brief for Heather K. Gerken et al. as Amici Curiae at 27 (citations omitted))).
209. Id.
210. Id.
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effectively rejected the claims on standing grounds.211 Ultimately, the
Court did not address whether the map itself was in violation of
constitutional principles.212
In Benisek v. Lamone—the Court’s second partisan
gerrymandering case of 2018—a dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claim was
upheld by the Court because the plaintiffs unnecessarily waited six
years after an election to challenge the legislative map.213 As such, the
Court again avoided the justiciability questions by instead requiring
plaintiffs to show “individual and personal injury” to the right to vote
in order for the Court to consider judicial intervention.214
It is not surprising that the Court would decide these cases on
procedural grounds where such issues existed, and avoid wading into
the “political thicket”215 of judging political maps unless and until
strictly necessary. This is consistent with long-standing principles of
eschewing political questions and ensuring standing exists, so as to
avoid involving the Court in matters that are not ripe or do not present

211. Arguably, however, the Court rejected the claims by looking past standing to
the substantive question of whether plaintiffs had established an actual injury rather
than by questioning simply whether a basis to claim one existed and was caused by
the redistricting map in question. Id. at 1930–31 (“Here, the plaintiffs’ partisan
gerrymandering claims turn on allegations that their votes have been diluted. That
harm arises from the particular composition of the voter’s own district, which causes
his vote—having been packed or cracked—to carry less weight than it would carry in
another, hypothetical district.”).
212. Id.
213. Benisek v. Lamone, 138 S. Ct. 1942, 1944 (2018) (“In considering the balance
of equities among the parties, we think that plaintiffs’ unnecessary, years-long delay
in asking for preliminary injunctive relief weighed against their request.”).
214. Whitford v. Gill, 138 S. Ct., 1916, 1931 (2018) (“[O]ur cases to date have not
found that this presents an individual and personal injury of the kind required for
Article III standing.”).
215. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., writing for the
plurality). While the majority of the Court dismissed the claim of unfair districts,
Justice Frankfurter’s opinion was delivered only on behalf of three members of a fourmember majority of the Court (since the Court was missing two members). Justice
Frankfurter wrote for the plurality that “To sustain this action would cut very deep
into the very being of Congress. Courts ought not to enter this political thicket. The
remedy for unfairness in districting is to secure State legislatures that will apportion
properly, or to invoke the ample powers of Congress.” Id. The case was no longer
considered particularly good law after Baker v. Carr, but the “political thicket”
language remains commonplace in redistricting discussions.
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a specific injury.216 Gill sets the bar quite high—if not impossibly
high—for judicial intervention in redistricting cases, requiring parties
to establish standing by showing an individualized, personal injury,
rather than a generalized injury to statewide voters or the collective
political interest of a larger political party. This approach also helps
the judiciary avoid criticism for taking either political party’s side in
an inherently political process.
Long-standing Supreme Court precedent nonetheless suggests
that the judiciary must remain open to addressing gerrymandering
cases due to the practical impacts of redistricting on voting rights and
the Court’s recognition of the importance of voting in our
representative democracy. Moreover, judicial consideration may be
the most effective course of addressing partisan gerrymandering
cases in a non-partisan manner because judicial review is intended to
be non-partisan (at least at the federal level, where judges are
appointed). Finally, if the judiciary continues to avoid cases of
partisan gerrymandering on justiciability grounds, despite the
findings of Davis v. Bandemer, state legislatures may feel increasingly
empowered to draw unfairly partisan maps without any fear of
restriction.217
In light of the legal importance of the right to suffrage, the
practical and statistical impact of political redistricting on the voting
outcomes, and the potential consequences of abdicating judicial
oversight of redistricting, the Court should not extract the judiciary
from partisan redistricting entirely. That is, the Court should not issue
any conclusions that extend the plurality opinion in Vieth.218
216. See, e.g., Abbot Laboratories v. Gardener, 387 U.S. 136 (1967) (analyzing the
ripeness doctrine); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (analyzing the political
question doctrine).
217. See Robert Pack, Land Grab: The Pros and Cons of Congressional Redistricting,
D.C.
BAR
(Apr.
2004),
https://www.dcbar.org/barresources/publications/washington-lawyer/articles/april-2004-redistricting.cfm
[https://perma.cc/WMK5-USWX] (“Any person or party seeking to have a new map
thrown out for political reasons faces an uphill battle. ‘Each year that passes and no
plan is ever found to violate that doctrine,’ says Klain, ‘the more the legislatures feel
themselves unencumbered [by the courts].’”).
218. The Supreme Court heard oral arguments on two new partisan
gerrymandering cases on March 26, 2019. The first case, Lamone v. Benisek, was
originally considered by the Court during the 2017–18 term and resulted in a brief,
unsigned opinion that left the merits unaddressed. Benisek v. Lamone, 585 U.S. ___
(2018). The case then went back to the district court. The district court ruled for the
plaintiffs and ordered the Maryland to draw a new map for the 2020 election. No.
1:13-CV-03233-JKB, 2018 WL 5816831, cert. granted (D. Md. Nov. 7, 2018). The
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That said, we are mindful of the limited role of the judiciary, the
importance of the political question doctrine, and of cases in which
the Court has issued perceivably “partisan” decisions in highly
politicized cases.219 As a result, courts should continue to be careful
and methodical in determining when to address partisan
gerrymandering cases. To balance these concerns, courts should only
assume the important responsibility of finding partisan
gerrymandering claims justiciable under carefully-assessed
circumstances, and they should approach such matters
acknowledging directly how the case outcomes may be perceived.
IV. TOWARD A STANDARD FOR ASSESSING UNDUE POLITICAL MANIPULATION
IN REDISTRICTING
As delineated throughout this article, the question remains: how
should the judiciary approach political redistricting in a manner that
is fair, mindful of political outcomes, and maintains public faith in the
judiciary? This requires workable standards that address two issues.
First, what is the appropriate standard for determining when a party
has standing to raise a gerrymandering claim—that is, what are the
boundaries of judicial consideration for a partisan gerrymandering
case? Second, what is the appropriate substantive standard to apply
to partisan gerrymandering claims?
A. Legislative Solutions: Nonpartisan Redistricting Commissions
Currently, nine states give “primary responsibility” for drawing
congressional district plans to nonpartisan redistricting
commissions: Arizona, Colorado, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana,
Michigan, New Jersey, and Washington.220 Although such practices

second case, Rucho v. Common Cause, also considers whether partisan
gerrymandering claims are justiciable and whether a congressional map, in this
instance North Carolina’s, is unconstitutional. No. 1:16-CV-1026, 2018 WL 4214334,
cert. granted (M.D.N.C. Sept. 4, 2018). Both cases provide the Court opportunities to
reconsider the plurality opinion in Vieth.
219. See supra Section II.
220. See NAT’L C ONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, Redistricting Commissions:
Congressional
Plans
(Jan.
21,
2019),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/redistricting/redistricting-commissionscongressional-plans.aspx [https://perma.cc/7DE6-4T7E] [hereinafter Redistricting
Commissions: Congressional Plans].
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have been challenged, 221 the Supreme Court has held that the
Elections Clause permits ballot initiatives to move district linedrawing power from a state’s legislature to an independent
commission.222 Other states utilize a commission on an advisory
basis, with primary responsibility remaining in the hands of the
legislature.223 Still others have explored, or are exploring, the
utilization of commissions in some regard.224 One potential advantage
of utilizing multi-partisan or nonpartisan commissions is that fewer
redistricting maps drawn by them lead to partisan gerrymandering
challenges before the courts.
Indeed, there is some evidence that these commissions are
already accomplishing important goals of districting reform. One such
goal is more competitive districts.225 For example, Arizona’s
Independent Redistricting Commission was created by ballot
initiative in 2000 and produced maps in 2001 and 2011. Those maps
had an average margin of candidate victory more than twenty-eight
percent lower than the rest of the nation.226 California followed in
2010 by creating the Citizen’s Redistricting Commission. After
creating the independent commission, California saw the number of
“toss-up” districts—those decided by five percentage points or
fewer—increase sharply, and its average margin of victory dropped
thirty percent from the previous decade.227 Put differently, the
districts drawn by these commissions have less partisan tilt in one
direction or the other.

221. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652
(2015).
222. Id. at 2673 (“Nothing in that Clause instructs, nor has this Court ever held,
that a state legislature may prescribe regulations on the time, place, and manner of
holding federal elections in defiance of provisions of the State’s constitution.”).
223. See Redistricting Commissions: Congressional Plans, supra note 220.
224. See NAT’L C ONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, Redistricting Commission Bills
(Dec.
8,
2017),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/redistricting/redistrictingcommission-bills.aspx [https://perma.cc/T45K-2NP7].
225. Kim Soffen, Independently Drawn Districts Have Proved to Be More
Competitive,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
1,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/02/upshot/independently-drawn-districtshave-proved-to-be-more-competitive.html [https://perma.cc/QE55-YST6]. But see
Peter Miller & Bernard Grofman, Redistricting Commissions in the Western United
States, 3 U.C-IRVINE L. REV. 637, 666–67 (expressing skepticism that increased
competitiveness can be fully explained by independent commissions).
226. Soffen, supra note 226.
227. Soffen, supra note 226.
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The commissions also have increased transparency and
openness, as they have held “a considerable number of hearings to
solicit input from the public.”228 Yet another virtue of the
commissions: they produce district maps on time and those maps go
unchallenged by costly and time-consuming litigation.229 This is in
contrast to legislatures, which frequently find themselves
deadlocked.230
Different commissions achieve these goals in different ways. The
commissions in Arizona and California, for example, took divergent
approaches to member selection.231 Most importantly, they differed
sharply in their approach to drawing district maps.232 However, both
had “clear, prioritized criteria” which guided the map-drawers,
insulating them from political bias. The “differences ultimately seem
to have been less important to the success of the commission than the
fact that there were clear and . . . prioritized rules.”233 The Arizona
commission is tasked with creating the most competitive districts that
it can. Arizona’s constitution states that “[t]o the extent practicable,
competitive districts should be favored where to do so would create
no significant detriment to the other goals.” 234 To promote
competition, the Arizona commission takes partisan data into
consideration.235 In contrast, the California commission is forbidden
from considering partisan data,236 and is required by its constitution
to respect “[t]he geographic integrity of any city, county, city and

228. Miller & Grofman, supra note 226, at 666.
229. See Miller & Grofman, supra note 226, at 651 (“As yet, a court has not stepped
into the process to draw maps when a commission is responsible for creating
congressional maps. Commissions consistently deliver district maps on time, and
largely without litigation.”).
230. See Miller & Grofman, supra note 226, at 651.
231. See Miller & Grofman, supra note 226, at 666.
232. Soffen, supra note 226.
233. Redistricting Commissions: What Works, BRENNAN CTR. FOR J USTICE (Jul. 24,
2018),
https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/redistricting-commissions-whatworks [https://perma.cc/LC4K-KYJT]; see Campaign Legal Center, Designing
Independent
Redistricting
Commissions
(2018),
https://campaignlegal.org/sites/default/files/201807/Designing_IRC_Report2_FINAL_Print.pdf [https://perma.cc/M8W4-LWV3].
234. ARIZ. C ONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(14)(F).
235. Soffen, supra note 226. (“In California, the commission was legally forbidden
from considering partisan data when forming the districts, as opposed to Arizona,
where the commission was supposed to use this data to promote competition.”).
236. Soffen, supra note 226.
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county, local neighborhood, or local community of interest . . . .”237
This means “keeping the rural areas in the same district or putting the
Northern California wineries in the same district as their
warehouses.”238
In other words, as the National Conference of State Legislatures
has stated, much depends on the make-up of each commission and the
scope of its assigned work.239 There is some evidence that
independent redistricting commissions achieve several important
redistricting goals that partisan legislatures struggle with. California
and Arizona present two different examples of how settled,
prioritized criteria can guide map-drawers in creating more
competitive district races.
Though it is not a complete solution, these practices have the
benefit of helping to ensure more redistricting plans are completed
outside of the legislature and with fewer abdication of map-drawing
or appeals to the courts. Other states were investigating such
initiatives as of this article’s drafting, and by the time of publication it
is possible other states’ voters will have approved new redistricting
commissions.240 Such practices, if permitted to expand to other states,
have the potential to help more courts avoid wading into the “political
thicket” of either drawing or reviewing redistricting maps.
B. Judicial Solutions: Appropriate Standards and Steps in the Political
Thicket
1. Establishing standards for evaluating partisan
gerrymandering claims
Although the redistricting commission is a promising construct
to insulate the judiciary—among other goals—it is only available
where new legislation or a ballot initiative approves its creation.
Given the primacy of the legislature, it appears that implementation
237. CAL. C ONST. art. XXI, § 2(d)(4).
238. Soffen, supra note 226.
239. Redistricting Commissions: Congressional Plans, supra note 220(“Reformers
often mistakenly assume that commissions will be less partisan than legislatures
when conducting redistricting but that depends largely on the design of the board or
commission.”).
240. Alexis Farmer & Annie Lo, Citizen and Legislative Efforts to Reform
Redistricting in 2018, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Oct. 26, 2018),
https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/current-citizen-efforts-reformredistricting [https://perma.cc/6AZ8-S8WE].
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of a redistricting commission cannot be required by judicial order. As
such, the existence of commissions in some states does not resolve the
question of when and on what grounds courts should assess and
decide questions of partisan gerrymandering.
a. Standing should not be an insurmountable barrier to
justiciability
First, it is critical to address the standing threshold, as standing
confers jurisdiction. Narrow interpretations of what constitutes
standing can significantly reduce the number of occasions when an
Article III court hears a partisan gerrymandering case. By way of
review, a threshold for consideration of political redistricting claims
is whether the plaintiff has standing to state a claim. To show standing
before an Article III court in a redistricting case, a plaintiff must have
“a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy,” requiring an
individualized injury to the person’s right to vote.241
This standing requirement in partisan gerrymandering cases was
upheld and further defined in Gill v. Whitford, largely by requiring that
a voter challenging a redistricting plan on partisan gerrymandering
grounds live in a district in which votes were “packed” or “cracked.” 242
In Gill, the lead plaintiff acknowledged that his ability to elect a
representative from his political party of choice would have likely
been essentially the same regardless of statewide partisan
gerrymandering. Other plaintiffs focused on statewide (rather than
individual district) impacts. Consequently, the Court found the
plaintiffs had no standing to pursue a partisan gerrymandering
case.243 The conclusion that a plaintiff must live in a district that is
affected by gerrymandering, which in turn means the plaintiff’s own
vote has been diluted by partisan efforts, is consistent with the
standing requirement of a “personal injury.” Absent this limitation, it
is conceivable that any individual of voting age could bring a partisan
gerrymandering claim in the State where she or he resides, regardless
of individual harm.
To avoid making the requirements for standing overly stringent,
however, it is critical to place certain terminology from the Gill
241. Glaze v. State, 909 N.W.2d 322, 325 (Minn. 2018) (“Standing is the
requirement that a party has a sufficient stake in a justiciable controversy. To have
standing on appeal, a party must be ‘aggrieved’ by the underlying adjudication.”).
242. Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1931 (2018).
243. Id. at 1933.
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decision into proper context. First, the references to an “individual”
injury should not foreclose a litigant who does live in an affected
district from claiming that the injury affects both voters in his or her
district and in the state at-large. Because voting districts must be
comprised of relatively equal populations—there cannot be gaps or
overlaps—a change to one or more congressional or legislative
districts necessarily affects the surrounding districts of the state. 244 It
is simply not possible to change only the boundaries of one single
district. Accordingly, the effect of gerrymandering on one district
cannot be separated from its effect on districts throughout the
state.245
Further, it is critical to acknowledge the important difference
between the lead plaintiff “expressly acknowledg[ing] that [the
redistricting plan in question] did not affect the weight of his vote,”
and the Court’s note that the lead plaintiff also acknowledged that his
district would be “under any plausible circumstances, a heavily
Democratic district.”246 While an acknowledgement that there is no
impact to one’s vote obviates any claim of standing, a plaintiff would
arguably still have standing to bring a partisan gerrymandering claim
where vote weight was affected, but the outcome of the election was
not changed because the district leans heavily toward one party. This
is because packing Democratic voters into one district may not affect
the ability of a voter in that district to elect a Democrat, but would
have the effect of “wasting” Democratic votes on a statewide basis.
Almost by definition, packing voters into one district has the effect of
cracking voters of another party into a different district to maximize
the impact on multiple districts.247 A prevailing plaintiff ultimately
must, of course, offer proof that such vote wasting actually
occurred.248 But for standing purposes, evidence that a district was
intentionally and/or more materially tilted to one political party
should be sufficient.249
244. See id. at 1937 (Kagan, J., concurring) (explaining that with enough plaintiffs
attacking individual districts in a statewide gerrymander, the “obligatory revisions
could amount to a wholesale restructuring of the State’s districting plan”).
245. For instance, compare a lead plaintiff acknowledgement that his own ability
to elect a Democrat in his district was not affected, to another plaintiffs’ decision to
focus on proving a statewide impact at trial instead of the impact on their own district.
These claims should be considered inseparable from the outcome of Gill.
246. Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1924, 1932.
247. Id. at 1924.
248. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 143 (1986).
249. Id. at 127.
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Finally, the requirement of an “individual” voter injury should
not be taken too literally. Gerrymandering by definition targets
groups of voters to achieve an outcome within a district or state. 250
The partisan mapmaker’s focus on a particular political party of which
the plaintiff is a member, and the effect of partisan gerrymandering
on the district in which the plaintiff lives, will ultimately have the
effect of diluting the power of individual votes.251 Further, it is almost
impossible to suggest that a map was drawn to affect one individual
voter when, by definition, the gerrymandering party is attempting to
move sufficient votes around to make a difference in an election.252 As
such, the focus of the Gill decision on an “individual injury” should not
be construed too narrowly.
This approach to standing is consistent with the concurring
opinion of Justice Kagan in the Gill decision.253 Specifically, Justice
Kagan joined in the Court’s finding that no standing existed, but stated
in her concurrence that:
This Court has explicitly recognized the relevance of such
statewide evidence in addressing racial gerrymandering
claims of a district-specific nature. “Voters,” we held, “of
course present statewide evidence in order to prove racial
gerrymandering in a particular district.” And in particular,
“such evidence is perfectly relevant” to showing that
mapmakers had an invidious “motive” in drawing the lines
of “multiple districts in the State.” The same should be true
for partisan gerrymandering.
Similarly, cases like this one might warrant a statewide
remedy.254
While one could argue in Gill—as the majority did—whether
Justice Kagan’s concurrence was necessary under the limited holding
of the case,255 the standing issue and Justice Kagan’s concurrence
serve two important purposes in the context of this article. First, Gill
illustrates a decision in which the Court took appropriate, largely
neutral steps to avoid becoming overly entangled in the “political

250. See Joann D. Jamuf, “Should I Stay or Should I Go?”: The Current State of
Partisan Gerrymandering, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 163, 168 (2005).
251. See id. at 169–70.
252. Id. at 209–10.
253. See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1934–41 (2018) (Kagan, J., concurring).
254. Id. at 1937 (emphasis in original) (quoting Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v.
Alabama, 135 S.Ct. 1257, 1265, 1267 (2015)).
255. Id. at 1931.
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thicket” of partisan gerrymandering.256 To the extent that media
criticism of the Court occurred following the Gill decision, it focused
largely on a desire for more clarity around partisan gerrymandering
standards, rather than on whether the Court was being overlypartisan as in other recent cases described earlier in this article. 257
Adhering to standing requirements—especially in such politicallycharged circumstances—is a good thing.
Second, and perhaps conversely, the standing discussion in the
Gill opinion underscores that there are limits on the extent to which
the Court can—or should—avoid partisan gerrymandering claims on
standing grounds.258 The inverse of the Gill decision would be the
argument that a plaintiff who lives in a district in which her votes were
diluted should have standing to state a partisan gerrymandering
claim. Where a plaintiff has standing to be heard on a legal question
involving the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution and the right
to suffrage, one might argue the judiciary should address those legal
questions and important rights. The next question, then, is whether
such a claim can be justiciable pursuant to an articulable judicial
standard.
b. To assess credibility of redistricting plans, look to states’
neutral redistricting criteria for drafting plans
As previously discussed in this article,259 a plurality of the United
States Supreme Court stated in Bandemer that partisan redistricting
claims are justiciable,260 while the plurality in Vieth stated that they
are not.261 In addition, the Vieth plurality argued that no federal court
has identified a manageable standard for evaluating partisan
gerrymandering, and largely rejected a standard based on evidence of
intent to gerrymander, actual effect on an overall plan, or a general
assessment of compactness, contiguity, and other neutral
redistricting criteria.262 The Vieth plurality likewise rejected
256. See id. at 1933–34.
257. Amy Howe, Opinion Analysis: Court Stays Out of Merits on Partisan
Gerrymandering, at Least For Now, SCOTUSBLOG (June 18, 2018, 1:40 pm),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/opinion-analysis-court-stays-out-of-meritson-partisan-gerrymandering-at-least-for-now/ [https://perma.cc/JE7D-F333].
258. See Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1929.
259. See supra Part III.C.
260. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 125 (1986).
261. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 305 (2004).
262. Id. at 305–06.
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standards for assessing partisan gerrymandering that focused
generally on “fairness” and the “totality of the circumstances.”263
Given the inherently political nature of redistricting, the standard
for establishing that a map is unconstitutionally partisan should be
based on a clear, and relatively high, standard. We believe, however,
that this is achievable. First, the Vieth plurality did not examine in any
detail how the “neutral redistricting criteria” that state courts have
successfully utilized to draw largely neutral maps might be measured
to assess maps allegedly drawn on impermissibly partisan
grounds.264
To address these questions, the approaches used by the
Minnesota Special Redistricting Panel and Pennsylvania court are
instructive and may present a reasonable solution. Specifically,
sophisticated redistricting software has now existed for several
decades265 and allows statistical measurements of redistricting plans
on several levels—providing objective quantification of how closely a
plan satisfies fundamental, neutral principles such as population
equality, contiguity, compactness, alignment with political
subdivision boundaries, and Voting Rights Act compliance.266
Further, we can say from experience with Minnesota’s redistricting
panels that it is manageable for a court to identify a range of
acceptable measures (e.g., population equality requirements,
compactness measures, percentage of political subdivision splits) that
would indicate a redistricting plan satisfies fundamental neutral
principles. This is, in fact, what the Minnesota Panels did, providing
maps and associated statistics to show satisfaction of neutral

263. Id. at 268–69.
264. Id. at 305–06.
265. See
CALIPER,
MAPTITUDE
FOR
REDISTRICTING
SOFTWARE ,
https://www.caliper.com/mtredist.htm [https://perma.cc/JH4Y-PZLJ]; see also
DISTRICTBUILDER, http://www.districtbuilder.org/ [https://perma.cc/GA3B-QMPD].
266. See, e.g., Hippert v. Ritchie, A11-152 (Minn. Special Redistricting Panel Nov.
4, 2011) (Order Stating Redistricting Principles and Requirements for Plan
Submissions); Zachman v. Kiffmeyer, C0-01-160, at 3 (Minn. Special Redistricting
Panel Dec. 11, 2001) (Order Stating Redistricting Principles and Requirements for
Plan Submissions). It is also worth noting that where courts are charged with drawing
maps from scratch, they may consider more abstract (albeit still potentially politically
neutral) criteria such as gender, communities of interest, etc. We do not suggest using
such additional criteria in the assessment of maps for partisan purposes, as these
categories are somewhat farther removed from the fundamental nonpartisan tenets
of redistricting, and may not serve to isolate partisan political goals.
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redistricting criteria. Experts also are available to provide data,
testimony, and analysis of how these criteria are met.
There also is evidence of the Supreme Court establishing numeric
standards related to redistricting. Indeed, the Supreme Court has
previously established exactly such metrics for population equality
within congressional267 and legislative districts,268 holding that
districts materially exceeding these thresholds create a prima facie
case for discrimination.269 Further, it is possible to establish
standards for compactness, contiguity, and equality of population
because specific levels were once legislated (though they are no
longer required by federal statute).270 While it would be ideal to have
legislation that specifies when a district or plan is overly partisan, it
can still be said that judicial assessment of, and adherence to, neutral
redistricting criteria acts as a counterbalance to overly-partisan
redistricting,271 while failure to adhere to such criteria may indicate
partisan bias.
That said, we do not propose specific percentages or numeric
ranges of acceptable outcomes in this article, as establishing such
standards could form the basis for a separate article or judicial
267. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983) (holding that the “equal
representation” standard of U.S. Const. Art. I, § 2, requires that congressional districts
“be apportioned to achieve population equality ‘as nearly as is practicable’” (citation
omitted)); see also Vieth, 541 U.S. at 276–77.
268. Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842–43 (1983) (“Our decisions have
established, as a general matter, that an apportionment plan with a maximum
population deviation under 10% falls within this category of minor deviations.”
(citing Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 418 (1977); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 764
(1973)).
269. Id. (“A plan with larger disparities in population, however, creates a prima
facie case of discrimination, and therefore must be justified by the State.” (internal
citation omitted)).
270. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2, 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a)-(b) (2012) (barring voting
qualifications or prerequisites to voting or standard, practice, or procedure which,
“based on the totality of circumstances, [are] shown that the political processes
leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally
open to participation by members of a class of citizen”); Thornburg v. Gingles, 478
U.S. 30, 50–51 (U.S. 1986) (identifying threshold conditions for a court finding that a
legislative district must be redrawn under the requirements of Voting Rights Act § 2).
271. We say “overly” partisan because it must be acknowledged, of course, that
all redistricting by legislative bodies is partisan to some extent, regardless of how
compact, contiguous, etc., the district(s) in question may be. The question arises
solely when such redistricting is so discriminatory as to violate the Equal Protection
Clause. See generally Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (outlining three elements
the Court uses to determine if redistricting is discriminatory).
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decision. However, because districts that have the explicit appearance
of gerrymandering—partisan or otherwise—tend to appear the least
compact and may tend to divide more political subdivisions, the
acceptable range of compactness and political subdivision split scores
should be fairly stringent. Establishing meaningful requirements for
compactness and maintaining political subdivisions has the further
benefit of increasing confidence in both the redistricting and judicial
review processes, since these measures help with the fundamental
logistics of administering elections, voting, and identifying
representatives.272
Additionally, because politics are an inherent part of
redistricting, and because it is not uncommon for geographic areas to
swing “blue” or “red” based on groups of people who choose to live in
the same area, we do not follow the equal population cases that
suggest the courts may find a prima facie case of discrimination where
these measures are not met. Rather, we propose a converse approach:
establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that any district that
satisfies these acceptable ranges of neutral districting criteria would
equate to a prima facie case that no unduly partisan redistricting
exists, even if the political benefits are largely one-sided.
Consequently, satisfying neutral redistricting criteria standards
would present the strong presumption that a plan is not unduly
partisan.
Where these criteria are not met, it would therefore still be the
plaintiff’s burden to prove that their individual district(s) or
statewide plan were: (1) the product of intentional partisan
districting meant to waste votes of the opposite political party or
maximize votes for the party in favor of the districting; and (2)
successful in diluting one’s ability to elect the party of his or her choice

272. Compact districts that do not split subdivisions make it easier for cities to
establish voting locations, reduce the number of different ballots that may be
required for any particular election, and reduce the cost of vote counting and
reporting. See Ryan D. Williamson, et al., This is how to get rid of gerrymandered
districts,
WASH.
P OST
(March
17,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/03/17/this-willget-rid-of-gerrymandered-districts/?utm_term=.20f647f0bf56
[https://perma.cc/44W3-U842]. Likewise, these same factors make it easier for
voters to understand who represents them; allow the populations of individual cities,
counties, and municipalities to have a louder collective impact on their elected
official; and sometimes simply make it easier to access a polling location. Id.
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in the district at issue. This is akin to the Davis v. Bandemer plurality
standard established decades ago.273
Although the Vieth plurality rejected a test of impact (successful
vote dilution) based on whether a majority party of the electorate is
precluded from electing a majority of representatives on the grounds
that a political majority could not be readily identified, this is an
overly narrow test of impact. There are two reasons for this
conclusion. First, as with neutral redistricting criteria, redistricting
software gathers evidence of political affiliation and voting history
that politicians and political parties alike use to develop district
plans.274 That same data can be assessed to determine the extent to
which packing and cracking efforts occurred. Second, we know that
studies are regularly conducted that specifically identify the impacts
of partisan “gerrymanders” on election outcomes. Now, it is possible
to discern when partisan goals have resulted in wasted votes and
influence on elections.275
Accordingly, this suggested standard combines several objective
measures of partisan discrimination: (1) failure to fulfill neutral,
applied statistical measures; (2) evidence of intentional
discrimination; and (3) statistical evidence of wasted votes. When all
those elements are present, and supported by documentary and/or
expert evidence, we submit that a finding of unconstitutional partisan
redistricting does not require definitive evidence that a particular
election outcome was prevented (which may indeed be a largely
impossible standard). Nor is the standard judicially unmanageable
because of a reliance on such abstract concepts as “fairness” or
“totality of the circumstances.” Rather, when the above conditions are
met, a court may apply the facts to the law and find that a redistricting

273. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 127 (1986) (concluding that
unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering occurs only in the event of “both
intentional discrimination against an identifiable political group and an actual
discriminatory effect on that group”).
274. See, e.g., C ALIPER, MAPTITUDE FOR REDISTRICTING SOFTWARE FEATURES,
https://www.caliper.com/redistrictingfeatures.htm
[https://perma.cc/NE32GYWM].
275. We do not intend to suggest that such data is perfect, nor that past voting
patterns necessarily determine future party status—or indeed any specific party
affiliation. But the same can be said of population and demographic data: By the time
redistricting is underway following each decennial census, the census data is already
stale. Likewise, incumbent data and political subdivision boundaries are changing all
the time.
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plan is overly-partisan and dilutes votes in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.
Ultimately, however, the goal is neither perfect data nor a perfect
standard. Perfection has never been required for either judicial
review of redistricting, nor in many other areas where the Court has
assessed fundamentally abstract concepts. “Manageable” is, instead,
more related to “reasonable,” “functional,” “practical,” and
“achievable.”276 As such, the more important goal—that this article
seeks to advance—is to create a reasonable judicial check on
legislative redistricting and the fundamental threats to the right to
suffrage that redistricting poses. In turn, elections will be made fairer
as compared to allowing partisan legislative redistricting to continue
wholly unconstrained.
2. Address perception of partisan judiciary through drafted
opinions
In multiple cases (some of which were discussed above) and in
media interviews, Supreme Court Justices have bemoaned the public
perception of the politicization of the Court. Several years before the
changes brought by Justice Scalia’s vacancy, Merrick Garland’s
nomination, and Brett Kavanaugh’s confirmation process, Chief
Justice Roberts noted the importance of the Court speaking with one
voice (when possible) and for the Justices to avoid personal criticisms
of each other.277 For example, Chief Justice Roberts stated “that every
justice should be worried about the Court acting as a Court and
functioning as a Court, and they should all be worried, when they’re
writing separately, about the effect on the Court as an institution.” 278
There is little question that “closely divided, 5-4 decisions make it

276. Manageable, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3rd ed. 2010).
277. Jeffrey Rosen, Roberts’s Rules, THE ATLANTIC (Jan/Feb. 2007),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2007/01/robertss-rules/305559/
[https://perma.cc/YZL4-4SGR] (noting that at the end of the prior term, “[o]pposing
justices addressed each other in unusually personal terms and generated a flurry of
stories in the media about the divisions on the Court, especially in cases involving
terrorism, the death penalty, and gerrymandering. Roberts seemed frustrated by the
degree to which the media focused on the handful of divisive cases rather than on the
greater number of unanimous ones, and also by the degree to which some of his
colleagues were acting more like law professors than members of a collegial Court.”).
278. Id.
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harder for the public to respect the Court as an impartial institution
that transcends partisan politics.”279
Yet the Court seems to often decide the most controversial cases
on precisely that divide—and not just any division of Justices, but
divisions that have been so frequently perceived to be on “partisan”
grounds. For many years, this involved one Justice (most recently
Justice Kennedy, and before him, Justice O’Connor) acting as the
“swing” vote. As such, the concern is less about whether decisions are
five-to-four or six-to-three, but rather whether cases are divided
between the “liberal” and “conservative” wings of the Court.280
While promoting unanimity and avoiding partisan divides are
good goals, especially in highly political cases involving alleged
partisan gerrymandering, even more is required of Justices seeking to
protect the judiciary. First, judges and Justices who repeatedly decide
cases on what they know will be perceived to be partisan lines need
to reconsider which cases they are accepting on certiorari (when
there is a choice) and how they are approaching their decisions.
Continuing down the current path of maintaining regular divides
between the “conservative” and “liberal” wings of the Court will only
further undermine public faith in the fairness of the judiciary, no
matter how correct the final decision may be.
This is not to say that judges should vote in a way they believe to
be incorrect for the sake of fostering a less divided Court. Rather,
other, smaller steps may help. There are multiple ways to look at a
case, and, frequently, multiple grounds on which to decide any given
case. Moreover, even the occasional decision along the lines of
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, where George
W. Bush appointee Chief Justice Roberts sided with the “liberal wing”
of the Court, helps break the public perception that the justices are
unavoidably divided along party lines.281
Additionally, Justices—and judges on other courts—should
explicitly acknowledge the political ramifications of any judicial
decision on partisan gerrymandering claims. Feigning total ignorance
of specific political implications while favoring a strict focus on legal
interpretation or generalizations about political issues set before the
279. Id.
280. Adam Edelman, ‘The Decider’: What Kennedy’s Legacy Means for the Supreme
Court’s
Future,
NBC
NEWS
(June
27,
2018),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/supreme-court/decider-kennedy-s-legacysupreme-court-swing-vote-n887166 [https://perma.cc/J94J-W5SX].
281. 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
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judiciary—as largely occurred in Bush v. Gore—is no longer
credible.282 This is particularly the case after the recent Supreme
Court confirmation proceedings, in which now-Justice Brett
Kavanaugh called out one political party in angry language and
tone.283 In the shadow of that hearing, it is not enough for the Court
to simply say in general terms that it is not partisan; these can be
empty words when the decision itself seems no different from
congressional votes on important legislation, divided heavily along
party lines.
In other words, the opinion or opinions of the Court on politicized
issues, especially such as partisan gerrymandering, should not only
acknowledge that they have waded into the political thicket, but
should also be explicitly clear that the Justices understand a particular
outcome may feed into the partisan interpretation. The Court, for
example, could include as part of its opinion an acknowledgment that
its decision, though grounded in the law, may result in partisan
criticism. Such an acknowledgement might be something like the
following:
We recognize that this outcome (in which a claim of
[Republican or Democratic] partisan gerrymandering is
[struck down or upheld]), especially as decided by this
majority, may be perceived as resulting from a particular
political influence or a desire to help that political party. We
have considered whether it is possible to maintain the
integrity of the Court and avoid that perception—but the
reality is that this is the right outcome based on the law,
which does not allow [briefly summarize legal problems
with alternate outcome]. We acknowledge such issues are
difficult for the courts and that any decision would likely be
viewed as if it were political. However, this Court is making
the decision based solely on the record and the applicable
legal standard. That is our duty.
Inclusion of language such as the text suggested above would
help signal to critics and the other branches of government that the
Court understands its proper and limited role in resolving political
disputes. Finally, the Court does not serve itself when a member of the
Court waits until after a decision is issued to comment that the Court
should not have decided the issue. A concurring opinion is one thing—

282.
283.

531 U.S. 98 (2000).
See supra notes 88–90 and accompanying text.
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and challenging enough; subsequent comments in the press only
appear to cast aspersions on other members of the Court.
Overall, the burden is on the Justices who issue a decision in a
politically difficult case to act, and they must decide the case in a
manner that protects the integrity of the Court. Routinely deciding
cases so that the majority opinion is joined by Justices appointed by a
member of one political party, while the dissent is authored by a
Justice (or Justices) appointed by the opposite party, creates the
impression that partisan politics have overtaken the Court. The
Justices of our United States Supreme Court, who make critical
decisions on such important issues to preserve the Constitution, must
also strive for greater consensus, avoid making personal attacks, and
focus on preserving the integrity of the judiciary branch.
V. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the judiciary’s ability to assess partisan
gerrymandering claims, while maintaining public faith in the integrity
of the courts, depends greatly on the judges’ and Justices’ decisions
and manner of expressing themselves. Solid legal analysis is
necessary, but not sufficient, to minimize the political fallout that
results from wading into the political thicket of redistricting claims,
especially when motivated by partisan politics. Such decisions must
have a basis in solid, “neutral” legal analysis, but should also recognize
explicitly that these cases involve challenging questions that overlap
with political issues. Moreover, judges involved in these cases should
take personal responsibility for their reactions and should be
carefully cognizant that decisions split along perceived political lines
on a court or panel will have negative consequences for public faith
and trust in the judiciary. Thus, while courts should not abdicate their
responsibility to act as a check on the other branches of government
in partisan redistricting cases, they must proceed with utmost care
and for the greater good.

